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INTRODUCTION
Job seekers and employers know the influential role that references
can play in the hiring process. Traditionally, reference checking is one
of the final steps in screening job applicants, taken just before a prospec-
tive employer extends a job offer to a candidate. A positive reference
assists the employer in confirming a candidate's qualifications, skills,
and talents. A negative, ambivalent, or lackluster reference can torpedo
an otherwise promising candidacy, or at the very least, lead a prospective
employer to entertain serious reservations about hiring the applicant. Re-
liable and detailed references provide useful information, thus employers
generally view references as a valuable part of the hiring process.'
I See, e.g., Terry Ann Halbert & Lewis Maltby, Reference Check Gridlock: A Proposal
for Escape, 2 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 395, 400-01 (1998) (discussing various meth-
ods for obtaining information regarding prospective employees, and noting that "there can be
no substitute for learning how an employee handled previous jobs. Without this information,
employers make costly mistakes."); Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willbom, Employer
(lr)rationality and the Demise of Employment References, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 123, 124 (1992)
(discussing the value of references in the selection process and noting that employment refer-
ences are "used to verify information given by the job applicants themselves, to help the em-
ployer predict performance or job success of job applicants, and to provide other important
information that may not be revealed by other sources."); Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the Laws
Governing Employment References: Problems of "Overdeterrence" and a Proposal for Re-
form, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 45, 50 and n.15 (1995); Probing Questions Are Necessary
When Checking References, HR REPORTER, Aug. 1996, at 2 (noting that although employers
are cautious about providing references, "all other things being equal, references can determine
whom you hire").
Surveys also indicate that employers value references in the hiring process. See, e.g.,
SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT REFERENCE CHECKING SURVEY (1998) at 5
[hereinafter SHRM 1998 Survey] (reporting that more than 80% of respondents regularly
check references of candidates for professional (89%), executive (85%), administrative (84%)
and technical positions (81%); 68% regularly checked references of applicants for skilled labor
positions; and 57% regularly checked references of applicants for part-time positions); Colleen
D. Ball, Job Reference Risks: Candor vs. Slander, USA TODAY, May 3, 1999, at 15A (report-
ing survey results from the Baltimore Business Journal in which 90% of responding employers
attempted to obtain references regarding prospective employees). While conventional wisdom
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While job applicants' resumes may state that references are "availa-
ble upon request," many employers routinely refuse to comply with these
requests. Increasingly, prospective employers who seek references en-
counter company policies which either prohibit provision of references
or limit provision to information such as job title, dates of employment
and salary history. 2 Such "no comment" and "name, rank and serial
number" policies are now the standards for many businesses, in stark
contrast to previous practices in which job references were freely
available.3
What precipitated this shift in job reference practices? Increasing
concern regarding the risk of being sued prompted many employers to
reexamine their job reference practices in light of a series of highly pub-
licized defamation verdicts in the 1980s.4 Publicity surrounding these
views references as useful components of the screening process, not everyone agrees. For
example, some of the human resources professionals interviewed by Halbert and Maltby ques-
tioned the value of references. Halbert & Maltby, supra note 1, at 396-97.
2 A number of commentators have discussed the trend toward limited reference policies.
See, e.g., Valerie L. Acoff, Note, References Available Upon Request... Not! - Employers
Are Being Sued for Providing Employee Job References, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 755 (1994);
Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, Encouraging Employers to Abandon Their "No Comment"
Policies Regarding Job References: A Reform Proposal, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1381
(1996); Markita D. Cooper, Beyond Name, Rank and Serial Number: "No Comment" Job
Reference Policies, Violent Employees and the Need for Disclosure-Shield Legislation, 5 VA.
J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 287 (1998); Paetzold & Willbom, supra note 1; Saxton, supra note 1; J.
Hoult Verkerke, Legal Regulation of Employment Reference Practices, 65 U. Cm. L. REv. 115
(1998); David Grant, Giving a Reference: Just Name, Rank, and Salary History?, LEGAL
TIMES, Nov. 30, 1987, at 16. Surveys of managers and human resource professionals also
provide evidence of this trend. See, e.g., SHRM 1998 Survey, supra note 1, at 8-9 (finding
76% of employers surveyed provide references when requested; however, the information pro-
vided is general, such as dates of employment, eligibility for rehire, and salary history. Re-
spondents typically decline to comment when prospective employers seek more in-depth
reference information); FYI Strictly Limited, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, Jan. 5, 1999, at ID
(finding 74% of respondents surveyed by the staffing firm Accountemps verified only names,
dates of hire and salary).
3 See, e.g., Charles D. Tiefer, Comment, Qualified Privilege to Defame Employees and
Credit Applicants, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 143, 146 (1977) (observing that "the number of
employer references ... has increased dramatically. References for former employees are now
written by the millions"); Deborah S. Kleiner, Is Silence Truly Golden?, H.R. MAG., July
1993, at 117 (noting previous practices in which "references were given on an ad hoc basis");
James W. Fenton, Jr. & Kay W. Lawrimore, Employment Reference Checking, Firm Size, and
Defamation Liability, J. SMALL Bus. MGMT., Oct. 1992, at 88 (describing routine reference
checks as "a time-honored ritual of employers"); Grant, supra note 2, at 16 ("It has been
traditional in the American workplace for employers to request and provide employee job
references.").
4 Sigal Constr. Corp. v. Stanbury, 586 A.2d 1204, 1206 (D.C. 1991) (relating that a
reference regarding a project manager stated he was "detail oriented to the point of losing sight
of the big picture," that "[w]ith a large staff [he] might be a very competent ... [project
manager]." The manager providing the reference also stated, "[o]bviously he no longer
worked for us and that might say enough"); see, e.g., Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678
S.W.2d 612, 617 (Tex. App. 1984) (awarding $1.9 million to plaintiff whose former managers
described as "untrustworthy," "untruthful," "disruptive, paranoid, hostile ... guilty of padding
2001]
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verdicts focused employers' attention on workplace defamation liability.
As legal scholars, journalists and other observers of workplace trends
noted large jury verdicts in job reference cases, 5 employers adopted in-
creasingly cautious approaches toward providing references. By the
mid-1990s, the "name, rank and serial number" reference had become
the preferred and advised policy for the litigation-wary employer.6 The
trend away from substantive references endures, notwithstanding empiri-
cal research demonstrating that the actual number of reference-based def-
his expense account,' "irrational, ruthless," "disliked by office personnel," "a classical soci-
opath," "a zero," and a "Jeckyll and Hyde person" who lacked "compucture [sic] or
scruples")(internal quotations omitted).
5 See, e.g., Fenton & Lawrimore, supra note 3, at 88; Roger B. Jacobs, Defamation and
Negligence in the Workplace, LAB. L.J. (Sept. 1989) 567, 571 (noting that "[slince 1980 there
have been forty libel awards in excess of one million dollars"); John Bruce Lewis et al., Defa-
mation and the Workplace: A Survey of the Law and Proposals for Reform, 54 Mo. L. REV.
797, 798 (observing that in workplace defamation cases, "[v]erdicts of more than $1 mil-
lion ... are not unusual and some verdicts have reached as high as $6 million"); Robert A.
Prentice & Brenda J. Winslett, Employee References: Will a "No Comment" Policy Protect
Employers Against Liability for Defamation?, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 207, 208-09 (discussing in-
creasing number of workplace defamation cases and noting that some cases resulted in "quite
substantial" judgments); Jeff B. Copeland et al., The Revenge of the Fired, NEWSWEEK, Feb.
16, 1987, at 46; Martha Middleton, Employers Face Upsurge in Suits Over Defamation, NAT'L
L.J., May 4, 1987, at 1; Kleiner, supra note 3, at 117; Tamar Lewin, Boss Can be Sued for
Saying Too Much, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1987, at B26; Workers Refused Jobs Due to Bad
References Winning Suits Against Ex-Employers, Lawyer Says, 64 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-
3, (Apr. 3, 1990).
6 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 2, at 292-97; JAMES G. FRIERSON, PREVENTING EMPLOY-
MENT LAWSUITS: AN EMPLOYER'S GUIDE TO HIRING, DISCIPLINE, AND DISCHARGE 229-30
(BNA 1994) (noting a "significant trend" since the 1980s of employers refusing to give refer-
ences or providing only job title and duration of employment in response to reference re-
quests); Robert Half Int'l, Inc, Survey Shows Employers Find it Harder to Check References
(Jan. 1993) (survey of 200 Fortune 1000 executives); News Release, Society for Human Re-
source Management, Reference Checking Leaves Employers in the Dark: Legal Concerns a
Stumbling Block, SHRM Survey Says (June 26, 1995) (news release published by Society for
Human Resource Management [hereinafter "SHRM"] reporting survey findings in 1995). In
its 1995 survey, SHRM reported that 63% of respondents reported that, fearing lawsuits, their
companies refused to provide information regarding former employees." More recent surveys
echo these concerns. See, e.g., SHRM 1998 Survey, supra note I, at 9-10 (reporting that
although most respondents stated that their organizations had not encountered any legal actions
as a result of providing references, 45% said that fear of suit prompted refusal to provide
references); FYI Strictly Limited, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, Jan. 5, 1999, at ID (74% of
respondents surveyed by the staffing firm Accountemps verified only names, dates of hire and
salary history). Human resource management texts also advocate the cautious "name, rank and
serial number" approach. See, e.g., CLIFF ROBERSON, HIRE RIGHT/FIRE RIGHT: A MANAGER'S
GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES THAT AVOID LAWSUITS 39 (1992) (advising employers
that "[tlhe safest policy ... is to provide only a statement of fact that the former employee was
employed from ... to... without any comment regarding the quality of the employment or
whether or not the individual was fired or left voluntarily); STEVEN MITCHELL SACK, FROM
HIRING TO FIRING: THE LEGAL SURVIVAL GUIDE FOR EMPLOYERS IN THE 90's 297, 305 (1995)
(cautioning employers to "[a]dopt a policy of simply confirming the facts of employment,
dates, duties and positions held" and to "[alvoid giving negative references to prospective
employers.").
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amation claims is small, with plaintiffs prevailing in only a fraction of
those cases. 7
Employers' concerns are not limited to the possibility of being sued
for defamation by former employees. In some cases, plaintiffs sued em-
ployers for misrepresentation based on positive references. In those
cases, employers gave positive references without disclosing information
regarding dangerous behavior by the employees. 8 Although employers
have no legal duty to provide references, one who chooses to give a
reference may be liable for misrepresentation if he or she provides in-
complete or misleading information.9 The misrepresentation theory pro-
vides an additional ground for employers to refrain from giving
references. 10
Problems may also arise when employers provide positive refer-
ences for some employees while not providing references for others. For
"name, rank and serial number" policies to work most effectively as de-
terrents to litigation, employers must consistently refrain from providing
7 Based on a survey of reported workplace defamation cases between 1965-1970 and
1985-1990, Professors Paetzold and Willborn concluded that the relative number of defama-
tion claims has not increased, employees seldom recover, and the size of recoveries has de-
clined. See Paetzold & Willbom, supra note 1, at 124. Paetzold and Willbom found that the
number of reference-based defamation cases was four from 1965-1970 and twelve from 1985-
1990, with employers losing 25% of the cases. Id. at 136-39. Updating this review of defama-
tion cases in 1997, Halbert and Maltby found only 13 reported cases in 1997, with plaintiffs
prevailing in four of the cases. In addition, Halbert and Maltby noted that "a plaintiffs award
of damages was upheld just once" and "[p]laintiffs failed to survive summary judgment in six
of [the thirteen] cases." Id. at 404 and n.29.
8 See, e.g., Davis v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 987 P.2d 1172 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999);
Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997) (unqualified, glowing
reference given to school principal who had been accused of molesting students); Jemer v.
Allstate (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1995) (No 93-09472) (employee who was fired after engaging in violent
and bizarre conduct in the workplace received a recommendation letter stating that he had
"voluntarily resigned" due to a restructuring and concluding that "[tihis action is in no way a
reflection upon [his] job performance"; employee later went on a shooting rampage after being
fired from the employer who had received the misleading recommendation). Allstate settled
the Jerner case in 1995. Allstate Settles Suit on Reference for Killer, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 16,
1995, at B2.
9 Randi W., 929 P.2d at 592-93 (emphasizing the affirmative nature of the alleged mis-
representations in the case and that mere failure to disclose alone would not be grounds for a
claim against the employer); Gutzan v. Altair Airlines, Inc., 766 F.2d 135, 141 (3d Cir. 1985)
(allowing plaintiff recovery on negligent misrepresentation theory where temporary agency
represented that it had verified employee's fabricated explanation of facts surrounding rape
conviction). See also Anthony J. Sperber, Comment, When Nondisclosure Becomes Misrepre-
sentation: Shaping Employer Liability for Incomplete Job References, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 405
(1998).
10 See Bradley Saxton, Employment References in California After Randi W. v. Muroc
Joint Unified School District: A Proposalfor Legislation to Promote Responsible Employment
Reference Practices, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 240, 265 (1997) (arguing that the ex-
isting legal rules of no duty to disclose but potential misrepresentation liability when employ-
ers provide information "should persuade many cautious employers to resort to 'no-comment'
reference strategies").
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references. An employee who receives either no reference or a "name,
rank and serial number" reference while other employees received more
complete or informative references may argue that the limited reference
constitutes unfair treatment by the employer."l In short, reference prac-
tices can trap the cautious employer as well as the unwary one. Conse-
quently, we should not be surprised that today's conventional wisdom
regarding job references echoes a familiar maxim: "silence is golden."
Recognizing the connection between fear of litigation and the
proliferation of no-reference policies, legislators and human resource
management lobbyists have pressed for statutes to immunize employers
from liability arising out of job references. ' 2 The goal of these statutes is
to encourage employers to provide references, based on the expectation
that qualified immunity in reference-based lawsuits will reduce employ-
ers' fears of being sued. 13
This Article posits that current reference immunity statutes are of
little use in encouraging employers to provide references. Moreover,
many of the statutes muddle, rather than clarify, the legal standards re-
garding potential liability or immunity, and many employers may decide
that refusing to provide references continues to be the clearest form of
protection from suit. Initial evidence, although primarily anecdotal, sug-
gests that the statutes have had virtually no impact on job reference prac-
tices. 14 Although legislation ostensibly protects employers in most
states, "name, rank and serial number," "no-comment," and neutral refer-
ence policies continue to prevail as standard practice regarding job
references.
Along with other commentators, I remain skeptical that the current
forms of legislation will encourage employers to abandon limited refer-
ence policies. 15 However, notwithstanding the skepticism of scholars
'' See Evan Fray-Witzer, The Minefield of Job References, THE N.J. L.J., May 18, 1998,
at 31. As Mr. Fray-Witzer, a Boston employment litigation and counseling attorney, explains:
"By their nature, 'name, rank and serial number' policies must apply to everyone (or else an
employee could argue that a [sic] such a response was simply code for 'keep away from this
person'"). Id.
12 See, e.g., Verkerke, supra note 2, at 131-32; Alex B. Long, Note, Addressing the
Cloud Over Employee References: A Survey of Recently Enacted State Legislation, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 177, 192 (1997).
13 See, e.g., Adler & Peirce, supra note 2, at 1420; Long, supra note 12, at 222. See
discussion infra Part II, at pp. 10-14.
14 See Cooper, supra note 2, at 311-12; Halbert & Maltby, supra note 1, at 411; Long,
supra note 12, at 222.
15 Commentators who have taken a skeptical view of the efficacy of existing reference
immunity statutes include Verkerke, supra note 2, at 131-32 (questioning the ability of the
statutory immunity to change the status quo because the statutes make no serious changes to
the existing structure of common law liability); Halbert & Maltby, supra note 1, at 410-11
(arguing that reference immunity statutes are too heavily weighted in favor of employer con-
cerns, do not protect employee interests, have failed to increase employers' security in provid-
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and other observers of workplace trends, state legislatures have enacted
reference immunity statutes in increasing numbers since the mid-1990s.
In light of the firmly established trend toward reference immunity stat-
utes, legislators should act to maximize the statutes' effectiveness and to
provide clarity in the law concerning job reference liability.
This Article proposes that the field would be clarified if the statutes
were the exclusive law governing liability for job reference claims under
state law. Generally, the existing statutes leave the common law in
place, so that reference claims may be adjudicated under statutory stan-
dards and common law standards. In addition, to change longstanding
perceptions and conduct, reference immunity legislation should be com-
bined with educational campaigns to inform employers and employees
about the existence of the statutes, and rights and obligations under the
statutes.16 Without dissemination of information, the legislative move-
ment has little chance of influencing workplace behavior. Employers
and employees need to know about the existence of reference immunity
laws. Otherwise, the statutes have limited opportunity to make a differ-
ence in the workplace.
Following an overview of common law principles applicable to job
reference claims in Part I, Part II of this Article discusses the objectives
of the emerging legislation. Part III examines the provisions of reference
immunity laws. Part IV concludes that these statutes have no impact on
employment reference practices. While I do not believe that legislation
alone can bring about significant changes in job reference policies and
practices, I refuse to conclude on such a dour, hopeless note. Conse-
quently, Part IV also suggests proposals for increasing the effectiveness
ing references, and "sharpen[ ] the degree of hostility in the employment context or take( I it as
a given"); and Long, supra note 12, at 180 (concluding that "the majority of statutes will
ultimately prove ineffective" in encouraging employers to provide references). Commentary
regarding specific state statutes reflects similar concerns. See, e.g., Phillip R. Jones, Jennifer
A. Youpa & Stacey S. Calvert, Annual Survey of Texas Law Article: Employment and Labor
Law, 53 SMU L. REv. 929, 962 (2000) (observing that "it appears unlikely that this statute will
produce major changes in the way employers handle requests for job performance information
regarding their employees"); Cathy A. Schainblatt, Comment, The New Missouri Employer
Immunity Statute: Are Missouri Employers Still Damned if They Do and Damned if They
Don't?, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 693, 699-700 (arguing that the Missouri statute does not de-
crease the odds that reasonable reference practices will be challenged, does not provide any
more protection than existing common law, and does not provide sufficient incentives for
employers to provide references); Jennifer L. Aron, Comment, The Tug-of-War with Employ-
ment Information: Does Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:291 Really Help Employers Stay Out of
the Mud?, 58 LA. L. REv. 1133 (1998) (concluding that the Louisiana immunity statute will be
of limited effectiveness because the statute "affords, if any, a small increase in the protection
already afforded by the jurisprudence").
16 The public and private sector should work in tandem to provide such information.
Legislatures could appropriate funds to ensure dissemination of information, efforts should be
made to obtain media coverage regarding the legislation, and private sector organizations rep-
resenting employers and employees must educate their constituents about the new laws.
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of job reference immunity statutes. These proposals focus not only on
modifying the legislative model but also on changing workplace culture,
norms and employers' perceptions regarding job references.
I. COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES OF JOB
REFERENCE LIABILITY
Job reference plaintiffs typically base their claims on a defamation
theory, asserting that a negative reference contained false statements that
injured the employee's reputation. In the employment context, false
statements impugning one's ability or fitness for his or her job or imput-
ing criminal conduct are defamatory. 17 Examples include unfounded al-
legations of misconduct, 18 incompetence or poor performance, 19 criminal
or other illegal conduct, 20 dishonesty, 21 and falsification of records.22 In
addition, a plaintiff may pursue a claim of intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage when an unfavorable job reference pre-
vents her from receiving a job offer that she would have received other-
wise. The interference tort may serve either as an alternative theory or
an additional cause of action in a reference case.23
Traditionally, common law defamation privileges served as the pri-
mary source of protection for employers sued for providing negative job
17 WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION RIGHTS
AND REMEDIES 245-46 (2d ed. 1993).
18 See, e.g., Barker v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 524 S.E.2d 821(N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (use
of illegal drugs and accessing pornography on the Internet while at work); Ritter v. Pepsi Cola,
785 F. Supp. 61 (M.D. Pa.1992) (drinking alcoholic beverages on the job); Lewis v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W. 2d 876 (Minn. 1986) ("gross insubordination").
19 See, e.g., Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 65 (Cal. 1979) ("lack of job knowledge");
Sigal Constr. Corp. v. Stanbury, 586 A.2d 1204, 1206 (D.C. 1991) (project manager described
as being "detail oriented ... to the point of losing sight of the big picture" and adding that
"with a large staff [he] might be a very competent [project manager]"); Stuempges v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980) (plaintiff described as a "poor salesperson"
was "not industrious... would not get products out, was hard to motivate and could not sell").
20 See, e.g., Krasinski v. United Parcel Serv., 530 N.E.2d 468, 469 (I11. 1988) (theft);
Deutsch v. Chesapeake Ctr., 27 F. Supp. 2d 642, 644 (D. Md. 1998) (sexual harassment and
racial discrimination).
21 See, e.g., Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1341 (Colo. 1988) (allega-
tions that plaintiff failed to report that she had been given medical clearance to return to work);
Kransinski, 530 N.E.2d, at 469 (theft allegations as grounds for dismissal for dishonesty).
22 See, e.g., Zinda v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 440 N.W.2d 548 (Wis. 1989) (employment
forms); Kelly v. Gen. Tel. Co., 186 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (invoices); Romano v.
United Buckingham Freight Lines, 484 P.2d 450 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (time and mileage
logs).
23 See, e.g., Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 667 N.E.2d 1296 (11. 1996); Stelzer v. Carmel-
ite Sisters, 619 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (interference cause of action combined
with slander claim); Geyer v. Steinbronn, 506 A.2d 901, 904 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (interfer-
ence claim combined with defamation). For a general discussion of the interference theory in
job reference cases, see Alex B. Long, Tortious Interference with Business Relations: "The
Other White Meat" of Employment Law, 84 MINN. L. REV. 863, 898-913 (2000).
[Vol. 11: 1
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references. 24 Under the common law, employers who provide job refer-
ences benefit from a qualified or conditional privilege. 25 The purpose of
the privilege is to promote candid and open workplace communication,
including providing employers with the freedom to give references with-
out fear of defamation liability.26 Some courts may apply these privi-
leges to interference with business relations claims as well. 27  The
common law qualified privilege protects employers unless they abuse the
privilege. An employer may abuse the privilege by providing informa-
tion that she knows is false, by acting in reckless disregard for the truth
or falsity of the information, by communicating the statements to persons
who are not within the purpose of the privilege, or by excessive
publication.28
Many employers, however, lack confidence in the qualified privi-
lege's capacity to protect them. While the privilege is a key defense to
reference-based claims, the legal standards can be complex, unclear and
uncertain. 29 Moreover, the issue of abuse is central to most cases where
qualified privilege arises. Because abuse of the privilege is a factual
24 In some states, the defamation law privileges are codified in statutes. See, e.g., CAL.
CIV. CODE § 47c (West 2001); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 23-1361(B)-(C) (Supp. 2000).
25 Courts have applied the common interest privilege to employment references. See,
e.g., Hett v. Ploetz, 121 N.W.2d, 270 at 272-73 (Wis. 1963); Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v.
Witherspoon, 657 P.2d 101, 105 n. 3 (Nev. 1983); Sigal Const. Corp. v. Stanbury, 586 A.2d
1204, 1213-14 (D.C. 1991); MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.8 at 20-21
(2d ed. 1999). The common interest privilege is described in the Restatement of Torts:
An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the circumstances lead
any one of several persons having a common interest in a particular subject matter
correctly or reasonably to believe that there is information that another sharing the
common interest is entitled to know.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 596 (1977).
In addition, based on the common interest privilege, courts have recognized a specific
qualified privilege for employment references. See, e.g., Chambers v. American Trans Air,
Inc., 577 N.E.2d 612, 615 (Ind. Ct. App.1991) ("As a general rule an employee reference
given by former employer to a prospective employer is clothed with the mantle of qualified
privilege"); Thacker v. Peak, 800 F. Supp. 372, 387 (S.D. W.Va. 1992) ("In conformity with
the Restatement's position, a number of states have recognized a qualified privilege in the
giving of employee references in response to a request from a prospective employer").
26 Pamela G. Posey, Note, Employer Defamation: The Role of Qualified Privilege, 30
WM. & MARY L. REv. 469, 484 (1989).
27 See Long, supra note 23, at 900.
28 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, § 1.8 at 21. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 605 (1977) (the privilege is abused by communication of a defamatory statement
where the speaker "does not reasonably believe [it is] necessary to accomplish the purpose for
which the privilege is given."). For other general discussions of the qualified privilege in the
job reference context, see Deborah Daniloff, Note, Employer Defamation: Reasons and Reme-
dies for Declining References and Chilled Communications in the Workplace, 40 HASTINGS
L.J. 687, 708-11 (1988) (describing and critiquing qualified privilege standards); Pamela G.
Posey, supra note 26, at 487-91; Donald Paul Duffala, Annotation, Defamation: Loss of Em-
ployer's Qualified Privilege to Publish Employee's Work Record or Qualification, 24 A.L.R.
4-' 144 (1983).
29 Cooper, supra note 2, at 305; Saxton, supra note 1, at 77.
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question, privilege issues often will go to a jury for resolution. 30 From
an employer's standpoint, the common law qualified privilege provides
limited, if any, protection as a practical matter.
The employer who asserts a qualified privilege can ex-
pect the plaintiff to argue that the employer abused the
privilege, and this issue . . . takes the case to the jury.
As cases reach juries, the likelihood of a plaintiff's ver-
dict increases. While employers ultimately may prevail
on appeal, litigation through appeal is a costly and drain-
ing process which employers generally prefer to avoid.
In addition, courts are hesitant to reverse a jury's factual
determination regarding ... loss of the qualified privi-
lege. Consequently, employers can expect to incur sub-
stantial defense costs as . . . cases proceed through
discovery, trial, and if necessary, appeal. 31
While the privilege may limit the number of actions in which em-
ployers ultimately face liability, most employers prefer to avoid litigation
entirely, if at all possible. The common law privilege, then, falls short of
providing a shield that encourages frank, candid, and open reference pol-
icies. To remedy this shortfall in protection, states crafted legislative
shields for employers, looking to statutory immunity as the solution to
the "name, rank and serial number" problem.
II. OBJECTIVES OF REFERENCE IMMUNITY LEGISLATION
To the extent that no comment and "name, rank and serial number"
policies protect employers, the protection comes at the expense of com-
munication in the job market. Employers' silence policies arrest the flow
of positive information as well as negative information that most typi-
cally creates the risk of being sued. The consequences of employer si-
lence affect the employers who seek references as well as job seekers
who would benefit from receiving positive references. When employers
refrain from disclosing information regarding dangerous or incompetent
employees, prospective employers, new co-workers and the public also
are affected. Furthermore, if refusal to provide substantive references
becomes standard workplace practice, fear of liability substantially chills
workplace communication, to the detriment of employers, employees and
society. As Halbert and Maltby observe:
30 See, e.g., Jones v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 790 (Alaska 1989);
Dominguez v. Babcock, 727 P.2d 362, 366 (Colo. 1986). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 619 (1977); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS,
§ 115 at 835 (5th ed. 1984).
31 Markita D. Cooper, Between a Rock and a Hard Case: Time for a New Doctrine of
Compelled Self-Publication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 373, 438 (1997).
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As a society, we are all harmed by the ongoing reality
that employees cannot show how well they are qualified
for positions, and that employers cannot quickly identify
the right people for the right positions. The problem...
undermines everyone's standard of living continuously;
it's a steady drain on our economy. Like a slow-acting
carcinogen, it does much of its damage just beneath our
communal consciousness. 32
As many employers refrain from providing references, most em-
ployers-including some who refuse to give them-continue to seek ref-
erences and see them as a critical part of the hiring process. Even though
fear of litigation chills the flow of reference information, employers still
need and desire such information. Instances of workplace violence
demonstrate the sometimes tragic consequences of employers' inability
to obtain relevant information in references, particularly in cases of em-
ployees with a history of violent conduct. 33 With increased concern re-
garding defamation claims and concern regarding workplace violence,
the widespread use of "no comment" reference policies gained the atten-
tion of state legislators. 34
In the early 1990s, only two states, Colorado and Florida, had en-
acted reference immunity statutes. 35 Ten years later, as 2000 drew to a
close, a total of thirty-six states adopted reference immunity legislation,
leaving only fourteen states and the District of Columbia without statu-
tory immunity. 36 At the beginning of the twenty-first century, reference
immunity is now a standard component of state employment law in the
United States.
Support for the statutes typically comes from lobbyists for human
resource managers, large and small businesses, and chambers of com-
merce. 37 Proponents herald reference immunity statutes as an effective
32 Halbert & Maltby, supra note 1, at 403.
33 See Cooper, supra note 2, at 314-24.
34 Most of the statutes appear to respond principally to employers' concern about defa-
mation liability, although negative references may generate interference and other claims from
employees. See Long, supra note 23, at 900.
35 Florida enacted the first such statute in 1991. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West 1997)
(effective July 1, 1991) (amended 1999). Colorado followed in 1992. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-2-114 (West 1997) (effective Apr. 29, 1992) (repealed and reenacted 1999).
36 Washington Governor Gary Locke vetoed a reference immunity bill in 1998. See Hal
Spencer, Job Reference Shield for Bosses Vetoed, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 3,
1998, at El. For a table listing the state reference immunity statutes in effect as of January
2002, see Appendix A.
37 The Fairfax, Virginia-based Society for Human Resource Management has been a
driving force for the passage of reference immunity statutes. Bill Leonard, HR Leads Fight for
State Reference-Checking Laws, HR NEWS (Oct. 1995). In addition, representatives of organi-
zations such as the National Federation of Independent Businesses, state and local chambers of
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response to employers' concerns regarding the risks of providing refer-
ences and the difficulty of obtaining useful information about job appli-
cants.38 The statutes discourage frivolous lawsuits based on job
references, 39 and reduce employers' fear of being sued for disclosing
more than "name, rank and serial number. '40 By reducing employers'
fear of liability, the statutes encourage employers to provide references. 41
The increased availability of references benefits employees and the pub-
lic as well. Employees who deserve positive references will benefit
when those references-rather than "name, rank and serial number" re-
sponses-are communicated to prospective employers.42 Some support-
ers assert that an increased flow of reference information will increase
safety in the workplace because employers will be more likely to dis-
commerce and other business advocacy groups typically appear in press reports as supporters
of immunity bills. See infra notes 38 and 40.
38 See, e.g., Scott Carlson, Job References Get Protection in Bill, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS, Apr. 22, 1999, at IC (supporters and sponsors of legislation arguing that employers
"will do a better job of hiring" based on a greater ability to disseminate information); Focus on
Job Reference Immunity, II INDIv. EMP. RTs. 14 (BNA) (May 21, 1996) (according to Rep.
Mary Lazich (R), sponsor of the Wisconsin statute, the legislation was prompted in part by
employers who needed more information regarding prospective employees' disciplinary
problems in previous jobs; legislation will "level the playing field in that the employer can feel
comfortable to give out honest and fair information"); Julie Forster, 25 States Adopt 'Good
Faith' Job Reference Laws to Shield Businesses from Liability, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS 6402
(July 2, 1996) in 1996 WL 363324 (before the legislation was enacted, employers did not have
enough information to make good hiring decisions, according to Michael Fields, the South
Carolina state director of the National Federation of Independent Businesses).
39 See, e.g., Catherine Candisky, 'Loser Pay' Amendment Won't Stay in House Bill, Co-
LUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 12, 1995, at 4B (reporting that intent of sponsor of Ohio statute "was
to protect business owners like himself from frivolous employee lawsuits").
40 See, e.g., The Morning Memo, THE KANSAS CITY STAR, May 12, 1999, at CI (report-
ing that Missouri Merchants and Manufactures Association and other supporters "say the pro-
visions reduce employers' fears that they will be sued for giving anything other than names
and dates of employment when asked for job references.").
41 See, e.g., Jeffrey Goodman, Providing References for Employees Just Got Easier for
Iowa - Part 1, IOWA EMPL. L. LETrER, July 1999 (immunity legislation protects employers and
encourages the free exchange of information); Bruce Hight, Bill Protects Companies from Job
Reference Suits; Former Employers Would be Given More Legal Protection from Libel Suits
for Honest Evaluations, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, May 7, 1999, at D3; Law Could Re-
store Real Job References, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 12, 1998, at A12 (editorial
endorsing legislation, arguing that the legislation would "restart" an "informal system of job
references" with employers feeling free to exchange information).
42 See, e.g., Nancy Hicks, Job Reference Shield Sought for Employers, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD, Feb. 5, 1999, at 16 (noting supporters' argument that good employees are penalized
by employers' refusals to provide references and quoting Nebraska bill's sponsor, Speaker
Doug Kristensen, who declared, "I'm more concerned about the good employee who does not
get a recommendation"); Ray Schow, Honest Job References Make Workplaces Safer, THE
SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 3, 1998, at B7 (article by the prime sponsor of Washington reference
immunity bill, arguing that reluctance to provide references hurts good employees who need
references); To Tell the Truth: Encourage Accurate Job References, MONTGOMERY ADVER-
TISER, Mar. 22, 1996, at IOA (urging approval of immunity bill and deploring "name, rank and
serial number" references as unfair to good employees who would benefit from good
references).
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close information regarding violent or other dangerous conduct by em-
ployees. 43 In all, say proponents, both employers and employees will
benefit from the reference immunity statutes.44 Accordingly, supporters
and sponsors view the statutes as necessary, effective, and crafted to
strike the proper balance of rights of employers and employees in the
matter of references.
Not so, say critics of the reference immunity statutes. In many
states, organized labor and trial lawyers lobbied in fierce opposition to
the legislation.45 Opponents argue that such laws focus only on employ-
ers' interests, without sufficient consideration of the rights of employ-
ees.46 For example, the statutes block meritorious claims by requiring
plaintiffs to prove the reference provider acted in bad faith, and in some
states, requiring such proof by clear and convincing evidence. 47 Oppo-
nents of the legislation also argue that the statutes are an unnecessary,
heavy-handy response to a perceived, but not actual, problem. These
critics emphasize that the actual amount of litigation involving employ-
ment references is small.48 Moreover, they conclude that existing com-
mon law provides adequate protection for employers.49 What the
43 See, e.g., David C. Olson, Minnesota: Key Reform Bills Head for State Senate, THE
METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, Feb. 2000, at 38 (workplace safety "depends on receiv-
ing accurate information about potential employees' past violent or harassing behavior");
Schow, supra note 42, at B7 (statute addresses public safety and permits employers to screen
unsuitable workers before they are hired); Tannette Johnson-Elie, Bill Could Ease Fear of
Giving References: State Legislation Gives Employers Immunity, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
June 2, 1996, at 1 (describing how state legislation would immunize employers for disclosing
an employee's history of violence or other workplace problems to prospective employers).
44 See, e.g., Truthful Job References The Issue: Bill Would Protect Candid Employers
Our View: It's Good for Businesses and Workers Both, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Mar. 17, 1999, at 43A (editorial supporting statute and arguing that "both job-seekers and
employers benefit when information flows freely and openly"); Law Could Restore Real Job
References, supra note 41 (editorial arguing that restoring the informal system of job refer-
ences would create a "real benefit to the majority of employers and employees").
45 Representatives of the AFL-CIO and trial lawyers' associations often appear in press
reports of efforts to defeat pending reference immunity bills, the statutes, and criticisms of
reference immunity legislation generally. See infra notes 47-50.
46 See, e.g., Halbert & Maltby, supra note 1, at 410.
47 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 38, at IC (Minnnesota Trial Lawyers Association's ar-
gument that statute with clear and convincing evidence standard "would virtually eliminate the
right of aggrieved workers suing for defamation" because of the stringent standard of proof).
See also discussion infra at Part III. C.
48 See, e.g., Hicks, supra note 42, at 16 (finding no need for a statute in a state where few
employees win lawsuits and quoting Kathleen Neary of the Nebraska Association of Trial
Attorneys as stating "[t]here have been no runaway verdicts"); Scott Carlson, Minnesota Bill
Would Give Protection to Job References, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Apr. 22, 1999, at IC,
available at 1999 WL 16645312 (statute not needed when less than 10% of employment law-
suits involve reference disputes) (position of Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association).
49 See, e.g., Jeff Sturgeon, Businesses Want Law to Take Risk Out of Giving References,
ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Feb. 1, 1998, at 2 (stating opponents' argument that ex-
isting court decisions protect employers); Andrew Backover, Legislation Would Limit Liability
for Truthful References; Trial Lawyers and Organized Labor Say the Proposal Could Lead to
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statutes provide, opponents warn, is a "blank check" for abusive refer-
ence practices, and little legal recourse for legitimately aggrieved
employees. 50
Both proponents and opponents may overestimate the power of ref-
erence immunity legislation. Currently available evidence suggests that
the statutes rarely affect employers' perceptions or conduct regarding
references.51 Moreover, even after legislatures enact immunity statutes,
legal advisors continue to recommend "name, rank and serial number"
references as the safest policy. 52
Abuse by Employers, FT. WORTH STAR-TEL., Dec. 12, 1998, at 1 (arguing that the statute is an
"unnecessary repetition of Texas common law").
50 See, e.g., Illinois Offers Employers Immunity for Truthful Employment References,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 116, June 17, 1996, at A-3 (noting argument by Daniel Johnson,
president of the Illinois AFL-CIO, that statute grants employers a "blank check to say almost
anything about an employee and suffer no consequences"); Hicks, supra note 42, at 16 (under
the statutes, "[e]mployers can lie with impunity") (quoting Nebraska Sen. Ernie Chambers).
51 While noting that the statutes are relatively new, Halbert and Maltby concluded that
"at this point the laws appear to be having little or no effect .... The hiring professionals we
spoke to for this article repeatedly told us that the fear of being sued remains as strong as
ever." Halbert & Maltby, supra note 1, at 411; see also Cooper, supra note 2, at 311-12
(discussing limited impact of immunity statutes).
52 See, e.g., Halbert & Maltby, supra note 1, at 411; Cooper, supra note 2, at 311-12. A
review of human resource and legal publications for employers also evidences little change in
advice and practices regarding job references, even after states adopt immunity statutes. See,
e.g., Bill Leonard, Reference Checking Laws: Now What?, HR MAG., Dec. 1995, at 57 (noting
that while Florida passed a reference immunity statute in 1992, employers in Florida tend to
verify only dates of employment and salary history of former employees); James C. Milton,
Former Employees May Use Job Reference Verification Services, Too, OKLA. EMPL. LAW
LETTER, Mar. 1999, at 2 (stating that "Oklahoma law offers some protection if you provide a
negative job reference and are later sued for defamation .... So what should you do if you're
asked for information about a former employee? Many risk-minded employers limit their
answers to dates employed and positions held. There is nothing wrong with this name, rank,
and serial number approach."); Colorado Legislature Creates New Wrinkles to Old Laws,
COLO. EMP. L. LETTER, June 1999, at 1 (advising procedures for providing substantive job
references after statute with the caveat that "[t]he old 'name, rank, and serial number' type of
job reference is the best shield against a defamation claim"); Terry E. Thomason, Job Refer-
ences Revisited, PAC. EMP. L. LETTER, June 1999, WL 3 No. 12 SMPACEMPLL 6, (providing
recommended procedures for providing references in light of the Hawaii Job Reference Immu-
nity Act, yet also noting that "[t]he safest job reference policy is one that authorizes the disclo-
sure of nothing more than employment data, such as full name, hire date, positions held,
salary/wage rate, and departure date.").
Cf Jeffrey Goodman, Providing References for Employees Just Got Easier for Iowa,
IOWA EMP. L. LETTER, July 1999, at 6-7 (discussing Iowa's reference immunity statute featur-
ing a heading proclaiming "[n]o more 'name, rank, and serial number'"). Post-statute advice
sometimes includes providing references only if the employee signs a release waiving claims
based on the reference. See, e.g., Legislature Passes Laws on Employment References, TEX.
EMP. L. LETTER, July 1999, at 2. Releases provide grounds for the defense of consent under
the common law defamation doctrine as well. See, e.g., Cox v. Nasche, 70 F.3d 1030, 1031
(9th Cir. 1995) (stating that employer has absolute privilege based on a signed release). See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977) ("[T]he consent of another to the publi-
cation of defamatory matter concerning him is a complete defense to his action for defama-
tion."); Adler & Peirce, supra note 2, at 1404.
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III. THEMES AND VARIATIONS: THE LANGUAGE OF
REFERENCE IMMUNITY STATUTES
As previously discussed, most states enacted reference immunity
statutes to encourage employers to provide candid, meaningful refer-
ences. Generally, these statutes protect employers who in good faith pro-
vide job-related information in references. 53 To prevail in a reference
claim, an employee must prove that her employer lacked good faith or
failed to comply with the statute in some other fashion.54 But what kind
of conduct constitutes a lack of good faith? How strong must the evi-
dence be to prove an employer acted in bad faith? What kind of informa-
tion is covered by the statute and under what circumstances is it covered?
Can employers and employees rely on both the common law and the
immunity statute? In answering these and other questions, the statutes
sometimes provide no guidance or are incomprehensible, and they can
vary widely.
A. PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Most statutes provide employers who give references a qualified
immunity from liability. 55 Typically, the statutes presume that an em-
ployer who provides a job reference acts in good faith.56 The presump-
tion is rebuttable. Some statutes accomplish a similar goal by
53 See discussion infra Part 1II. A.
54 See discussion infra Part III. B.
55 The overwhelming majority of statutes provide qualified immunity. The Kansas stat-
ute also provides absolute immunity for specified categories of information. KN. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-119a(c) (2000). See discussion infra Part III.B.4.
56 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.160 (Michie 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-3-
204(a)(2) (Michie 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709(a) (Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 34-1-4(b) (Michie Supp. 2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.95(a) (Supp. 2000); IDAHO CODE
§ 44-201(2) (Michie 1997); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN, 46/10 (West Supp. 2001); IND. CODE
ANN. § 22-5-3-1 (Michie 1997) ("immune from civil liability ... unless proven ... that the
information was known to be false at the time disclosure was made"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23:291A (West 1998) ("immune from civil liability... provided such employer is not acting
in bad faith") (the heading of § 291 refers to "presumptions"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 26,
§ 598 (West Supp. 2000); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-423(b) (1998); MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. § 423.452 (West 2001) ("presumption of good faith". or similar language);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 61.A (West 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.178 (1999); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 28-6/4-1(c) (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-12 (Michie Supp. 2001); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-1-105 (Supp. 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. §34-42-1(2) (1997) ("rebuttable presump-
tion that an employer is acting in good faith when the employer provides information... at the
request of a prospective employer"); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-46. .A (Michie 2000); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 895.487(2) (West Supp. 2001); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 27-1-113(a) (Michie 2001) ("pre-
sumed to be acting in good faith" or similar language). The Arizona statute ties the presump-
tion of good faith on the size of the employer. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361.C (West
Supp. 2001) (for employers who employ less than 100 employees, the good faith presumption
applies if the employer provides reason for termination or information regarding job perform-
ance, professional conduct or evaluation; if the employer employs at least 100 employees and
has a "regular practice" in Arizona of providing information to prospective employers upon
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conditioning the immunity on good faith without expressly offering a
presumption of good faith.57 Under either formulation, plaintiffs cannot
prevail in job reference claims without proving that the reference pro-
vider did not act in good faith. This threshold requirement increases the
difficulty of establishing a job reference claim, particularly in states that
require plaintiffs to establish lack of good faith with clear and convincing
evidence.5 8
B. REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH
Because the centerpiece of the immunity is the employer's good
faith, statutes should set forth clear standards for what constitutes good
faith or its absence. Most immunity statutes do not offer groundbreaking
new standards in this area. Instead, statutes typically echo the language
of common law defamation standards for abuse of the qualified privilege
by providing that defendants forfeit the immunity when they knowingly
provide false information, 59 or act with reckless disregard for truth or
falsity. 60 A few states venture further, permitting plaintiffs to prove bad
request regarding reasons for termination or information about job performance, professional
conduct, or evaluation, the good faith presumption applies to such disclosures).
57 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a(a) (2000) ("Unless otherwise provided by law,
an employer ... who discloses information about a current or former employee to a prospec-
tive employer of the employee shall be qualifiedly immune from civil liability."); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 50-12-1 (Michie Supp. 2000) ("When requested to provide a reference on a former or
current employee, an employer acting in good faith is immune from liability for comments
about the former employee's job performance. The immunity shall not apply when the refer-
ence information supplied was knowingly false or deliberately misleading, was rendered with
malicious purpose .... "); Mo. REV. STAT. § 290.152.4 (2000) ("[A]n employer shall be im-
mune from civil liability ... unless such response was false and made with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard for whether such response was true or false."); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-737 (2001) ("A nonpublic employer ... is not liable ... unless the em-
ployer knowingly, purposely, or negligently disclosed information that was false."); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 41.755(3) (Michie 1999) (enumerating circumstances under which employer is
not immune); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71(3)(B) (Anderson 2001) ("An employer who is
requested by an employee or a prospective employer of an employee to disclose to a prospec-
tive employer ... information pertaining to the job performance of that employee ... is not
liable in damages in a civil action ... unless the plaintiff in a civil action establishes .... );
S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65(B),(D) (Law Co-op Supp. 2000) ("Unless otherwise provided by
law, an employer shall be immune from civil liability ... This protection and immunity shall
not apply where an employer knowingly or recklessly releases or discloses false
information.").
58 See discussion infra Part III.B.I.
59 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.95(b)(1) (Supp. 2000); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 46/10 (West Supp. 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-737 (2001) ("knowingly" or "pur-
posely . . . disclosed information that was false"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.755.3(d)
(Michie 1999) ("intentionally disclosed inaccurate information"); N.D. CENTr. CODE § 34-02-
18.2.a (1999 Supp.); OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71(B)(1) (Anderson 2001); TEx. LAB.
CODE ANN. § 103.004(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-46.1(A) (Michie
2000). See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
60 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361(D) (West Supp. 2001); MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-423(b)(2) (1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.452.2(a) (West
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faith by demonstrating that the employer's reference violated nondis-
crimination or civil rights laws, 61 or confidentiality or other
agreements. 62
1. Lack of Good Faith: Knowing Falsity, Recklessness,
Negligence, or Malicious Purpose
Under some statutes, a plaintiff can rebut the good faith presump-
tion by proving the employer knew the information was false or that the
employer intentionally or deliberately provided misleading informa-
tion.63 An employer who discloses false information without knowing it
was false risks losing immunity under statutes that provide a showing of
reckless 64 or negligent65 conduct rebuts the presumption of good faith.
2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 61(A) (West 1999); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 103.004(a)
(Vernon Supp. 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-46.1.A (Michie 2000). See discussion infra Part
III.B.1.
61 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.160(2); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-114(6) (West
Supp. 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West Supp. 2002); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/
10 (West Supp. 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-12-1 (Michie Supp. 2000); IowA CODE
§ 91B.2.a. (West Supp. 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71(B)(2) (Anderson 2001); OR.
REV. STAT. § 30.178 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.4-1(c)(4) (2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-
1-105(5) (2001 Supp.); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 895.487(2) (West Supp. 2001). See discussion
infra Part III.B.2.
62 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709(a) (Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4(b)
(Michie Supp. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-12 (Michie Supp. 2001) (confidentiality
agreements); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.755.3(f) (Michie 1999) (any agreement with the
employee). See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
63 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.95(b) (Supp. 2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 41.755.3(d) (Michie 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-02-18.2.a; 18.2.b (1999 Supp.); TEX.
LAB CODE ANN. § 103.004(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-46.1.A (Michie
2000); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/10 (West Supp. 2001); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4113.71(B)(l) (Anderson 2001). The statutes in Colorado and Florida, two states that were
among the first to enact reference immunity legislation, originally included similar language.
In 1999, however, both legislatures deleted the knowing falsity language. The Colorado stat-
ute was repealed and reenacted at that time; the Florida statute was amended. See CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 8-2-114 (West Supp. 2001), Historical and Statutory Notes; FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.095 (West Supp. 2002), Historical and Statutory Notes.
64 See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §23-1361.D (West Supp. 2001); MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-423(b)(2) (1998); Micti. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.452 sec.2b (West
2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.7553(d) (Michie 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 61A
(West 1999); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 103.004 (Vernon Supp. 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
46.1.A (Michie 2000) (recklessness).
65 See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-114(3)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2001) (information
disclosed was false and "[t]he employer who furnished the information knew or reasonably
should have known the information was false."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-737 (2001) (negli-
gence); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.12(a)(2) (1999) (employer "knew or reasonably should have
known that the information was false"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.755.3(c) (Michie 1999)
(disclosure of information which employer "had no reasonable grounds for believing was ac-
curate"). The Florida statute is codified in Chapter 768 of Florida Statutes, under general tort
law provisions regarding negligence. The statute, however, does not state a negligence stan-
dard for rebutting the presumption of good faith. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West Supp.
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In some states, the statutes also consider the reference provider's motive
or attitude toward the plaintiff, permitting plaintiffs to rebut the presump-
tion by proving the employer provided false information with a malicious
purpose.66 One state, Maine, requires the plaintiff to prove malicious
intent as well as proving that the disclosure was false or deliberately
misleading. 67 The meaning of malicious purpose under the statutes re-
mains largely undefined. Perhaps no specified meaning is required.
Consider the Georgia statute, which provides that proof of "lack of good
faith" rebuts the presumption of good faith.68 The statute offers no fur-
ther explanation or definition of good faith. This treatment of good faith
and bad faith is reminiscent of the words of United States Supreme Court
Justice Stewart: "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of
material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description;
and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it
when I see it. ' '69
While perhaps one does recognize lack of good faith when one sees
it, the most likely result of the statutory scheme is that the definition of
good faith will only become apparent after the issue is litigated. Because
the existence or lack of good faith determines whether the employer has
immunity, statutes should provide clearer guidance for employers and
employees regarding exactly what kind of conduct forfeits the immunity.
66 See e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.160(1); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-3-204(a)(2) (Michie
2001) ("malice"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709(a) (Supp. 2000); IowA CODE § 91B.2.c (West
Supp. 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 598 (West Supp. 2000); MD. CODE ANN., CTS
AND JUD. PROC. § 5-423(b)(1) (1998) ("actual malice"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.755.3(a)
(Michie 1999) ("malice"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-12-1 (Michie Supp. 2000); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 34-02-18.2.d (1999 Supp.); OHIO REV. CODE § 4113.71(B)(1) (Anderson 2001);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 61.A (West 1999) ("malice"); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.178 (1999);
R.I. GEN LAWS § 28-6.4-1(c)(3) (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-12 (Michie Supp. 2001);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105 (2001 Supp.); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 103.004(a) (Vernon
Supp. 2002) ("malice"); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 895.487(2) (West Supp. 2001); WYo. STAT. ANN.
§ 27-1-113(a) (Michie 2001). The statute in California does not use the presumption language,
but does speak in terms of lack of malice as prerequisite for privileged status. CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 47(c) (West Supp. 2001) (Privilege applies to "a communication concerning the job perform-
ance or qualifications of an applicant for employment, based upon credible evidence, made
without malice, by a current or former employer of the applicant to, and upon the request of,
the prospective employer.").
67 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 598 (West Supp. 2001) (requiring "clear and convinc-
ing evidence of ... knowing disclosure, with malicious intent, of false or deliberately mislead-
ing information"). The statutes in Colorado and Florida originally permitted a showing of
malicious purpose to defeat the immunity. In 1999, these legislatures deleted the malicious
purpose language by repealing and reenacting the Colorado statute and by amending the Flor-
ida statute. See CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN . § 8-2-114 (West Supp. 2001), Historical and Statu-
tory Notes; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West Supp. 2002), Historical and Statutory Notes.
68 GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4(b) (Michie Supp. 2001).
69 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Justice Stewart's words regarding ob-
scenity in his concurring opinion).
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2. Violation of Law
In ten states, employers who provide references that violate civil
rights or nondiscrimination laws will lose the immunity. 70 Some states
limit applicable civil rights statutes to state law, while others include
federal law.71
These provisions exclude discriminatory references from the protec-
tion of the statutes. At first glance, discrimination provisions in the im-
munity statutes may appear superfluous because discriminatory
references violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.72 However,
not all employers are covered by Title VII. For example, Title VII does
not apply to employers with fewer than fifteen employees. 73 Conse-
quently, nondiscrimination provisions in the immunity statutes clarify
that any employee who suffers discrimination in references may sue an
offending employer.
Three statutes speak more broadly regarding the "violation of law"
ground for forfeiting the immunity. In Michigan and Nevada, an em-
ployer loses the immunity if the disclosure violates state or federal law
generally. Neither statute confines its language to anti-discrimination or
civil rights laws.74 The Arkansas statute precludes immunity where an
employer uses a reference to discriminate or retaliate for an employee's
exercise of his or her rights under federal or state statute or for "actions
encouraged by the public policy of this state. '75
70 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.160(2) (Michie 2000) ("violation of civil right ... pro-
tected under [state] or ... federal law"); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-114(6) (West Supp.
2001) (providing that the reference immunity statute shall not be "construed to abrogate or
contradict the provisions of [Colorado's law prohibiting discriminatory or unfair employment
practices (CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-34-401 et seq. 2000)]"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West
Supp. 2002) (employer loses the immunity by violating "any civil right protected under [the
Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (Fla. Stat. § 760.01 et seq.)]");745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/
10 (West Supp. 2001) ("violation of a civil right"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-12-1 (Michie Supp.
2000) (civil rights); OHiO REv. CODE ANN. § 4113.71(B)(2) (Anderson 2001) ("disclosure
constitutes an unlawful discriminatory practice under state law"]); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.178
(1999) (violation of civil right under state law); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.4-1(c)(4) (2000) (vio-
lation of "employee's civil rights under employment discrimination laws in effect at the time
of the disclosure"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105(5) (2001 Supp.) (violation of "civil rights
pursuant to current employment discrimination laws"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.487(2) (West
Supp. 2001) (reference violates state employment discrimination statute).
71 See supra note 70.
72 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
73 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
74 MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.452 (West 2001) (disclosure "specifically prohibited
by a state or federal statute"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.755.3(f) (Michie 1999) (disclosure
"in violation of a state or federal law").
75 ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-3-204(e) (Michie 2001). Under section 11-3-204(e), the immu-
nity does not apply in the following circumstances: "[Wihen an employer or prospective em-
ployer discriminates or retaliates against an employee because the employee or the prospective
employee has exercised or is believed to have exercised any federal or state statutory right or
undertaken any action[s] encouraged by the public policy of this state." Id.
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The "violation of law" provisions in these statutes make explicit
what may be assumed in other statutes-the qualified immunity does not
extend to illegal conduct. Specific reference to this issue also helps to
define categories of conduct that constitute lack of good faith. This gui-
dance, while helpful, may still leave questions. Where some states' pro-
visions refer specifically to violations of other statutes as the standard of
illegal conduct, the Michigan, Nevada and Arkansas statutes refer more
generally to violations of "law or statute," or of the state's public policy.
This language might be read to include actions contrary to judicial deci-
sions and administrative regulations as violations of law that strip an em-
ployer's immunity. Otherwise, the legislature could have stated-as a
few legislatures have-that the immunity does not apply where the em-
ployer violates statutory law. If legislatures intend to look beyond stat-
utes to define violations of law, the statutes should make this clear. The
Arkansas statute, which precludes immunity for statutory violations and
violations of state public policy, illustrates this approach. 76
3. Disclosure of Confidential Information
Under the Delaware, Georgia and South Dakota statutes, an em-
ployer loses immunity if the reference discloses confidential informa-
tion.77 The confidential nature of the information may arise from a
nondisclosure agreement or state or federal law, local statute, rule or reg-
ulation.78 Under the Nevada statute, where an employer forfeits immu-
nity for a disclosure that violates an agreement with the employee, 79
broad language covers confidentiality agreements and other types of
agreements as well. In these states, employers should exercise caution
when disclosing truthful information as well as guarding against false
statements. The reference immunity statutes in these states will not pro-
tect communication of truthful information in references where the infor-
mation should be kept confidential by agreement or statute.
The confidentiality provisions should provide an added measure of
protection for employees by requiring that employers honor agreements
and employees' expectations that confidential information will not be
used against them in an unfavorable job reference. Presumably, by ex-
cluding confidential material from the disclosure immunity, legislatures
76 See supra note 75.
77 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709(a) (Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4(b)
(Michie Supp. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-12 (Michie Supp. 2001).
78 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709(a) (Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4(b) (Michie
Supp. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-12 (Michie Supp. 2001) (nondisclosure agreement
or information that is confidential under state or federal law).
79 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.755.3(f) (Michie 1999) (providing that "[a]n employer is
not immune from civil liability ... if the employer ... [d]isclosed information in violation of a
state or federal law or in violation of an agreement with the employee")(emphasis added).
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implicitly ensure that existing common law, contract or tort theories
based on breach of confidentiality remain available to aggrieved employ-
ees. Similarly, the Nevada statute's more general provision covering any
agreement encourages employers to honor agreements with their employ-
ees.80 Thus, the confidentiality and agreement provisions of the Dela-
ware, Georgia, Nevada and South Dakota statutes provide a measure of
additional protection for employees.
4. The Kansas Approach: Absolute and Qualified Immunity
The Kansas legislation adopts a unique approach, providing abso-
lute immunity as well as qualified immunity. The qualified immunity
portion of the statute provides that "unless otherwise provided by law, an
employer, or an employer's designee, who discloses information about a
current or former employee to a prospective employer of the employee
shall be qualifiedly immune from civil liability." 81
However, the legislature failed to set forth in any portion of the
statute how a plaintiff would prove that an employer does not qualify for
the immunity. This omission creates difficulties. The statute provides
neither employers nor employees with any notice or guidance of condi-
tions necessary for retaining the immunity. In future sessions, the Kan-
sas legislature should remedy this omission with an appropriate
amendment. 82
Absolute immunity protects employers in Kansas who disclose (1)
dates of employment; (2) pay level; (3) job description and duties; and
(4) wage history. 83 Absolute immunity also applies to the disclosure of
(1) written evaluations conducted before departure and available to the
employee; 84 and (2) indications of whether the employee was voluntarily
or involuntarily released from her position and the reasons for the separa-
tion.85 With the exception of disclosure of evaluations, voluntary or in-
voluntary nature of the separation, and reasons for the separation, the
information protected by the absolute immunity constitutes the basic
neutral or "name, rank and serial number" reference. Such strategies, of
course, are the ones adopted to avoid defamation claims. While a neutral
or "name, rank and serial number" reference is unlikely to provide the
80 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.755.3(f) (Michie 1999).
81 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a(a) (2000).
82 Apparently, Kansas legislators noticed this problem. During the 1997 legislative ses-
sion, Rep. Swenson introduced a bill to amend the section and repeal the existing section. The
amendment would have rendered inapplicable all immunities - absolute as well as qualified -
where an employer or prospective employer discriminated or retaliated against an employee or
prospective employee who exercised federal or state statutory rights or who undertook action
encouraged by Kansas public policy. The statute, however, has not been amended.
83 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a(b)(1)-(4) (2000).
84 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a(c)(1) (2000).
85 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a(c)(2) (2000).
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basis for a defamation claim, the absolute immunity section may have
been adopted to insulate employers from negligence claims regarding the
release of neutral references and evaluations. This absolute protection,
however, invites a possibility of abuse in situations where malicious or
other false statements exist in an evaluation. Even absent abuse, confer-
ring absolute immunity for statements in evaluations or explanations of
termination can serve as a disincentive to assuring the accuracy of em-
ployment information and places the burden on the employee to attempt
to correct any misinformation. Therefore, qualified immunity would
serve more effectively to balance the concerns of employees as well as
employers.
C. EVIDENTIARY STANDARD FOR PROVING LACK OF GOOD FAITH
Good faith, or lack of it, is the central, determinative factor in
whether or not a reference provider benefits from the immunity. Under
most statutes, a plaintiff must overcome a presumption that the employer
acted in good faith.86 The statutory presumption scheme places the bur-
den of proof on the plaintiff, and her claim will fail if she cannot estab-
lish the requisite employer misconduct. Moreover, some states place a
particularly heavy burden on plaintiffs, requiring clear and convincing
evidence of the employer's lack of good faith.87 While the preponder-
ance standard applies in the majority of the reference immunity stat-
utes,8 8 the effectiveness, value and fairness of the higher standard of
clear and convincing evidence is the subject of debate.
Proponents of the clear and convincing standard contend the higher
standard of proof protects employers and encourages them to give refer-
86 Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(c) (West Supp. 2001) (no good faith presumption).
87 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West Supp. 2002); IDAHO CODE § 44-201(1) (Michie
1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 598 (West Supp. 2000); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. AND JUD.
PROC. § 5-423(b) (Michie 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-12 (Michie Supp. 2001); TEX.
LAB. CODE ANN. § 103.004(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-42-1(3) (1997);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-46.l.A (Michie 2000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.487(c)(2) (West Supp.
2001).
88 Fifteen statutes expressly require the plaintiff to establish lack of good faith by a pre-
ponderance of evidence. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.160 (Michie 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-3-
204(a)(2) (Michie 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-114(3) (West Supp. 2001); GA. CODE
ANN. § 34-1-4(b) (Michie Supp. 2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.95(b) (Supp. 2000); 745
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/10 (West Supp. 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-3-1(b) (Michie
1997), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291.A (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.452
(West 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71(B)(l)-(2) (Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, § 61.A (West 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.178 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6/4-1(c)
(2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105 (2001 Supp.); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 27-1-113(a) (Michie
2001). Most statutes, however, do not specifically address the evidentiary standard for proving
lack of good faith. One can assume that, where the statute does not expressly state the re-
quired burden of proof, the preponderance standard, which is the generally applicable burden
of proof in civil litigation, applies. See KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EvI-
DENCE, § 339 at 574 (4th ed. 1992). See also Adler & Peirce, supra note 2, at 1422.
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ences.8 9 The more stringent evidentiary burden will discourage lawsuits
and assuage employers' fears of suit,90 thus allowing employers to feel
free to provide references. In contrast, opponents of the clear and con-
vincing evidence standard argue that the tougher evidentiary standard is
too high, creating an insurmountable hurdle for plaintiffs. 91
In reality, cautious employers are unlikely to vary their reference
practices based on the evidentiary standards in a reference immunity stat-
ute, and some commentators argue that there is little practical difference
between the two standards of proof. As one newspaper editorial writer
notes:
The lawyers may see a big difference between "prepon-
derance of evidence" versus "clear and convincing evi-
dence," but for most managers the difference is mush.
Under a law using either wording, most lay people are
still going to think twice about giving negative refer-
ences, and they're probably still going to be circumspect
if they do.92
Similarly, Professor Verkerke argues that in defamation cases, the
burden of proof does not impact reference practices. He urges legislators
to be "skeptical of reform proposals that would shift the quantum of
proof required to show an abuse of the conditional privilege" because
"no available evidence shows that substantially increasing or decreasing
the burden of proof on defamation plaintiffs would generate a better bal-
ance between the quantity and quality of references. '93 Indeed, empiri-
cal research reveals that juries do not distinguish between the
preponderance standard and the clear and convincing evidence standard
in their decision making:
89 See, e.g., Law Could Restore Real Job References, supra note 41, at At 2 (supporting
reference immunity bill with clear and convincing evidence standard, acknowledging that clear
and convincing is higher standard than preponderance and arguing that "[a] higher standard is
certainly needed" to encourage employers to give references).
90 See, e.g., L.M. Sixel, Name, Rank and Job References, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 16,
1999, at I (arguing that decreasing the risk involved in giving references, legislature can
"make it more difficult for former employees to sue by raising the burden of proof").
91 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 38, at IC (stating that a clear and convincing standard
virtually eliminates the right to sue and noting that the Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association
has expressed concern); Catherine Candisky & Lee Leonard, House Approves Job References
Bill; Employers Would be Given Immunity, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 22, 1995, at 6B (stat-
ing that while "'[tihere is a legitimate need to protect employers from being sued over refer-
ences .... [the proposed bill] requires a substantially tougher burden of proof than in other
civil cases") (quoting Ohio state Rep. Bill Schuck who introduced a proposal to reduce the
burden of proof in cases affected by bill to preponderance of the evidence).
92 Getting Good Reference Shouldn't Be So Hard, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Mar. 27, 1995,
at 10A (commenting on passage of Ohio house bill).
93 Verkerke, supra note 2, at 161.
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Judges and lawyers make two assumptions about the
standards of proof. First is the assumption that jurors'
probability estimates match their own. Second is their
assumption that jurors can reliably distinguish between
the standards and use them in their decision making. Al-
though members of the court and bar may have a clear
understanding of the distinction between these different
standards and may be able to demonstrate the distinction
between them, the subtle differences between the stan-
dards may be lost on jurors. 94
In light of the empirical research, management perceptions, and
scholarly observation, legislators who have emphasized the burden of
proof may have expended substantial energy on an issue that may have
little practical significance in changing reference policies and practices.
D. INFORMATION COVERED BY THE IMMUNITY
Generally, the statutes immunize disclosure of information regard-
ing an employee's job performance and other work-related information,
such as "professional conduct or evaluation"95 or reasons for leaving a
job.96 Statutes vary in their descriptions of job performance. Some stat-
utes refer to job performance with no explanation, 97 while others define
94 See, e.g., Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About
the Jury Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 589, 632-33. The authors' work
cites empirical studies regarding participants' understanding of the differences between the
legal standards of preponderance'of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt. The results of the studies showed that jurors did not distinguish between the
standards when presented in qualitative instructions. When jury instructions quantified the
differences between the standards of proof, however, jurors were more successful in distin-
guishing the standards of proof and understanding the meanings of the standards. Id. at 633.
95 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361C (West 2001); IDAHO CODE § 44-201(2) (Michie
1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-42-1(1) (1997) (providing immunity for disclosure of informa-
tion regarding "job performance, professional conduct, or evaluation"). South Carolina's stat-
ute also covers "written employee evaluations." S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65(C)(1) (Law Co-op
Supp. 2000).
96 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a(c)(2) (2000) (providing absolute immunity for em-
ployer's written response to prospective employer's written request of information - to which
employee may have access - regarding whether employee "was voluntarily or involuntarily
released from service and the reasons for separation"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65 (Law Co-op
Supp. 2000) (providing qualified immunity for employer's written response to prospective
employer's request for information regarding whether employee "was voluntarily or involunta-
rily released from service and the reason for the separation); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291.A
(West 1998) (providing immunity for former employer who provides accurate information
about a former employee's "reasons for separation"); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRoc.§ 5-
423(a) (1998).
97 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.160 (Michie 2000); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.95(a)
(Supp. 2000); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/10 (West Supp. 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4113.71(B) (Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 61.A (West 1999); OR. REV.
STAT. § 30.178 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.4-1(c) (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-12
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job performance in very specific terms. 98 Statutes also may enumerate
other categories of work-related information in addition to job perform-
ance, such as illegal or wrongful conduct,99 reasons for separation, t°° and
general information regarding duration of employment, wage history and
job description. 1 1
(Michie Supp. 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105 (2001 Supp.); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 27-1-
113(a) (Michie 2001); see also CAL. CIv. CODE § 47(c)(3) (West 2001) ("job performance or
qualifications"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.487(l)(c) (West Supp. 2001) ("job performance or
qualifications for employment"); cf. Mo. REV. STAT. § 290.1521.2(2) (2000) (protecting dis-
closure of "the nature and character of service rendered" by an employee).
98 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-2-114(l)(a)-(c) (West Supp. 2001) (defining job
performance as: "suitability of the employee for reemployment; the employee's work-related
skills, abilities, and habits that may relate to suitability for future employment; and [in the
case of a former employee, the reason for the employee's separation"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
19, § 709 (b)(l)-(b)(3) (Supp. 2000) ("job performance or related characteristics ... [a]ny act
committed by such employee which would constitute a violation of federal, State or local law;
or... [a]n evaluation of the ability or lack of ability of such employee or former employee to
accomplish or comply with the duties or standards of the position held"); GA. CODE. ANN.
§ 34-1-4(b) (Supp. 2001) ("job performance, any act committed by such employee which
would constitute a violation of the laws of this state if such act occurred in this state, or ability
or lack of ability to carry out the duties of such job . . . "); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23:291(C)(5) (West 1998) (defining job performance as including, but not limited to, "at-
tendance, attitude, awards, demotions, duties, effort, evaluations, knowledge, skills, promo-
tions, and disciplinary actions"); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 598 (West 2000) ("job
performance or work record"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65 (A)(5) (Law Co-op. 2000) ("'[j]ob
performance' includes, but is not limited to attendance, attitude, awards, demotions, duties,
effort, evaluations, knowledge, skills, promotions, and disciplinary actions"); TEX. LAB. CODE
ANN. § 103.002(3) (Vernon Supp. 2002) (defining job performance as "the manner in which
an employee performs a position of employment" and includes an analysis of the employee's
attendance at work, attitudes, effort, knowledge, behaviors, and skills); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-46. .C (Michie 2000) (providing that "'job performance' includes, but is not limited to,
ability, attendance, awards, demotions, duties, effort, evaluations, knowledge, skills, promo-
tions, productivity and disciplinary actions").
99 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § I l-3-204(a)(l)(G) (Michie 2001) ("[t]hreats of violence,
harassing acts, or threatening behavior related to the workplace or directed at another em-
ployee"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.755.1(c) (Michie 1999) ("[a]n illegal or wrongful act
committed by the employee").
10 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-3-204 (a)(1)(H) (Michie 2001); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 290.1521.2(3) (2000).
1O1 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § Il1-3-204(a)(l)(A)-(C) (Michie 2001); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 290.152.2(2) (2000) ("nature and character of service rendered . . . and the duration
thereof"). The Arkansas immunity statute describes with great specificity the information that
an employer may disclose. Subsection (a)(1) provides:
(A) Date and duration of employment;
(B) Current pay rate and wage history;
(C) Job description and duties;
(D) The last written performance evaluation prepared prior to the date of the
request;
(E) Attendance information;
(F) Results of drug or alcohol tests administered within one (1) year prior to the
request;
(G) Threats of violence, harassing acts, or threatening behavior related to the work-
place or directed at another employee;
2001]
26 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
Other statutes speak in broader language, providing immunity from
disclosure of "information" regarding employees. 10 2 This category could
include a broad array of disclosures regarding employees, such as infor-
mation about personal conduct away from the workplace that may not be
limited, or relevant to, job performance. 10 3 The New Mexico statute per-
mits disclosure on a more informal basis, covering "comments about job
performance."'04 The statutes in Delaware and Georgia also protect em-
ployers who disclose an employee's violations of law to prospective em-
ployers. Neither the Delaware nor the Georgia statute limits the
information to violations of law that occurred in the workplace or are
otherwise work-related. 10 5
Two statutes further specify that the information protected by the
immunity must be truthful or believed in good faith to be truthful. 106
Five statutes provide that the employer's disclosure must be "fair and
unbiased,"' 1 7 "factual,"' 0 8  "accurate," 10 9 or "based upon credible evi-
dence."110 These additional qualifications may protect employees by fa-
(H) Whether the employee was voluntarily or involuntarily separated from employ-
ment and the reasons for the separation; and
Whether the employee is eligible for rehire.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-3-204(a)(1) (Michie 2001).
102 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West Supp. 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-
119a(b) (2000); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/10 (West Supp. 2001); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 50-1-105 (Supp. 2001). In 1999, the Florida legislature broadened the statute's language on
this issue. The language of the previous version used the more limited phrase, "information
about ... [an] employee's job performance." See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West Supp.
2002), Historical and Statutory Notes. Cf VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-46.1C (Michie 2000)
("'[i]nformation' includes, but is not limited to, facts, data and opinions").
103 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a(a) (2000). Apparently, the qualified immunity pro-
vided in Kansas is designed to cover broad categories of disclosures, as the statute affords
qualified immunity for an employer "who discloses information about a current or former
employee to a prospective employer." Id. In the absolute immunity provisions of the Kansas
law, the legislature chose specific language protecting disclosure of dates of employment, sal-
ary, job description and duties, and salary history. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119a(b) (2000).
Similarly specific language covers written evaluations conducted before departure that are
available to the employee, information concerning whether the employee left the job volunta-
rily or involuntarily, and the reasons that the employee left her job. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-
119a(c) (2000).
104 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-12-1 (Michie 2000).
105 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709(b)(2) (Supp. 2000) (covers federal, state or local laws);
GA. CODE. ANN. § 34-1-4 (b) (2001) (includes only acts violating Georgia law which occurred
in that state).
106 See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/10 (West Supp. 2001) ("truthful written or verbal
information, or information that [the employer] believes in good faith is truthful"); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 50-1-105 (Supp. 2001) ("truthful, fair and unbiased information").
107 See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.4-1(c) (2000); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105
(Supp. 2001) ("truthful, fair and unbiased information").
108 GA. CODE. ANN. § 34-1-4 (b) (2001).
109 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291(A) (West 1998).
1 0 CAL. Civ. CODE § 47(c)(3) (West Supp. 2001).
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cilitating rebuttal of the good faith presumption.' 11 On the other hand,
these requirements present potential factual issues that will require reso-
lution by juries including the determination of what is "fair," "unbiased,"
"accurate," or "credible." These factual considerations can present a vir-
tual minefield for employers that significantly weakens the protective
shield of the immunity. Perhaps to avoid this problem, Michigan re-
quires the information provided by the employer to be "documented in
the [employee's] personnel file."' 12 While this approach might clarify
what information is protected, it also limits what is available for refer-
ences and what prospective employers might find useful.
Commonly understood meanings of terms such as "job perform-
ance" may provide sufficient guidance regarding the information covered
by the immunity statutes. To the extent that statutes cover information
beyond work performance or work-related conduct, the immunity sweeps
too broadly. The better approach confines the immunity to work-related
information and encourages employers to focus on characteristics related
to job performance and qualifications when they provide references. In
addition, requirements of fairness and credibility ideally preserve the
rights of employees. These requirements, however, may also provide
grounds for litigation regarding what is fair or credible. This dilemma
may be inevitable in any legislative solution to the "no comment" refer-
ence problem. Statutory provisions may still present grounds for litiga-
tion, leading employers back to the comfortable refuge of "name, rank
and serial number."
E. DOES IMMUNITY APPLY ONLY TO REFERENCES PROVIDED IN
RESPONSE TO A REQUEST?
In some instances, employers may share information about job ap-
plicants without receiving a formal request for a reference. For example,
Employer A, who has a business or personal relationship with Employer
B, may know that X, one of her current or former employees, has applied
for a job with Employer B. In that situation, Employer A might, in the
course of business dealings or social interaction, share negative thoughts
about X's work or character with Employer B. If Employer B considers
the unsolicited information and decides not to hire X, X may then sue
S11 A statute that protects information only if it is "accurate," however, may not be consis-
tent with a presumption that the employer acts in good faith. Analyzing the Louisiana statute,
one commentator observes that, given the accuracy requirement, the statute may not protect
errors made in good faith. "What does 'accurate' mean? Does this mean that the statute does
not cover information that is false, even if it was sincerely believed to be true? If so, employ-
ers in Louisiana who make a good faith error are not protected by this statute." Aron, supra
note 15, at 1153.
112 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.452 (West 2001).
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Employer A for disclosing the information when Employer B had not
requested a reference.
In a common law defamation claim, Employer A may assert that the
unsolicited communication is protected by the qualified privilege. 13
While a request for information is not a prerequisite to the application of
the privilege, whether the information was requested or unsolicited is
relevant to a determination that a communication "is within generally
accepted standards of decent conduct" and therefore privileged.'1 4 De-
pending on the circumstances in which Employer A shared the informa-
tion, she may lose the privilege if a jury determines that her conduct was
not within generally accepted standards.
Employer A's privilege defense stands on even weaker ground if X
sues her for tortious interference with business relations. Under this
cause of action, an employer may be liable if she volunteers information
about an employee without a request for information from a prospective
employer."15 The unsolicited response would be an unjustified interfer-
ence with X's prospective employment with Employer B.
How do the reference immunity statutes deal with unsolicited infor-
mation? The majority of statutes protect only those employers who pro-
vide references upon request. Most statutes provide immunity for
information given at the request of either a prospective employer or a job
applicant.1 6 In ten states, the immunity specifically covers information
requested by a prospective employer."17 The New Mexico statute re-
113 See discussion Part I, supra at pp. 8-10.
114 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595(2)(a) (1977); see also KEETON ET AL., supra
note 30, at § 115 ("The absence of a request is one factor to be considered in determining the
propriety of the defendant's conduct").
115 See Long, supra note 23, at 902-04 (noting that the Second Restatement provides a
privilege for truthful information or for advice honestly given in response to a request for
advice. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 772 (1977)). To the extent the privilege relied
upon is based upon honest advice, that advice "must be within the scope of a request" and
"stray, unrequested statements or opinions may not be protected, and the provider may be
liable if she volunteers them." Long, supra note 23, at 904.
116 See, e.g. ALASKA STAT. 09.65.160 (Michie 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-
114(3) (West Supp. 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West Supp. 2002); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 34-1-4(b) (Michie 2001); IDAHO CODE § 44-201(2) (Michie 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23:291.A (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-423(a)(1) (1998); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.452 (West 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-737 (2001); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4113.71(B) (Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 61.A (West 1999)
(also requires the employee's consent); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.178 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 28-6.4-1(c) (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-12 (Michie Supp. 2001); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 50-1-105 (2001 Supp.); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 103.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 27-1-113(2) (West Supp. 2001).
117 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361.C (West Supp. 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-3-
204(a)(1) (Michie 2001) (requires employee's written consent as well as request by prospec-
tive employer); Mo. REV. STAT. § 290.152(2) (2000) (permitting employer to provide a writ-
ten response to "an entity or person which the employer reasonably believes to be a
prospective employer"); CAL. CIV. CODE § 47c (West Supp. 2001); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT.
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quires the reference be given "upon request" without specifying who
makes the request." 8 In Texas, the statute authorizes disclosure upon the
request of either the employee or a prospective employer." 9 Maryland
explicitly extends its immunity to requests by government authorities as
well as requests by employees or prospective employers. 120 The Nevada
statute provides immunity where an employee requests that the employer
disclose information or where an employer discloses information to a law
enforcement agency regarding a current or former employee who has
applied for a position as a peace officer.121
The request requirement strikes a proper balance between the rights
of employers and employees. 122 An employer who volunteers unsolic-
ited negative information about an employee should be prepared to jus-
tify doing so, particularly in cases where the information is false or
unsubstantiated. The most compelling cases for providing unsolicited
negative information are situations involving dangerous or violent con-
duct in the workplace. 123 In those cases, the balance tips in favor of
disclosure as a means of promoting and increasing workplace safety.124
To provide a greater measure of protection to employees, however, care
should be taken to assure that stray remarks, undocumented information,
ANN. 46/10 (West Supp. 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65(C) (Law Co-op Supp. 2000);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-42-1(2) (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-46.1.A (Michie 2000) (request
by prospective or current employer). The Kansas absolute immunity for disclosure of written
evaluations and information about the nature of and reasons for release also requires the re-
quest of a prospective employer.
118 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-12-1 (Michie Supp. 2000) ("When requested to provide a refer-
ence on a former or current employee, an employer acting in good faith is immune from
liability for comments about the former employee's job performance... .
119 TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 103.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
120 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PIOC. § 5-423(a)(2) (1998) (immunity applies if em-
ployer is "requested or required by a federal, state, or industry regulatory authority or if the
information is disclosed in a report, filing, or other document required by law, rule, order, or
regulation of the regulatory authority").
121 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.755(1)-(2) (Michie 1999). Subsection 2 refers to disclo-
sures pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. § 239B.020, which pertains to reference requests by law
enforcement agencies.
t22 But see Aron, supra note 15, at 1152 (viewing request requirement as "imprudent").
123 Compare Cooper, supra note 2, at 326 (noting that justifiable disclosure would apply
to "violent conduct that physically injured or posed a significant risk of physical injury to
employees, customers or clients in the workplace" rather than mere "displays of anger, loss of
temper, or frustration." with Aron, supra note 15, at 1152 (asserting that "[s]tatements made by
a former employer compelled by a moral duty to divulge" are protected under common law
immunity and should be protected under statutes). In lieu of a request requirement, Aron
proposes the following: "the information must be requested unless the employer divulging the
information has a compelling interest." Id. at 1163.
124 See generally Cooper, supra note 2.
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and offhand comments receive proper scrutiny. Statutes that require
written disclosure can promote this objective. 125
F. WRITTEN INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
Most reference immunity statutes do not require the employer to
provide references in writing. The statutes in Kansas, Missouri, South
Carolina and South Dakota, however, specify that immunity applies to
written information. 26 In addition, the Missouri statute requires the re-
sponding employer to send a copy of any reference letter to the em-
ployee, and the employee may request a copy of the letter for up to one
year following the date of the letter.' 27 The Michigan statute requires
protected disclosures be based on information "documented in the [em-
ployee's] personnel file."' 128 In Illinois, the immunity covers "written or
verbal information," but does not require protected references be in
writing. 129
Two statutes, which do not require written responses or written re-
quests, do require employers to provide copies if written information is
used in a reference. The Colorado and Indiana statutes require employ-
ers to send copies of any written communications to employees upon the
employee's request. The requirement in Colorado applies to employers
125 See id. at 325 (promoting a statutory "disclosure-shield" framework requiring the ref-
erences to be in writing, with copies provided to employees for review, rebuttal, and explana-
tion where needed).
126 The Kansas statute provides absolute immunity for disclosure of employee evaluations
and information about the nature and reasons for the employee's separation from employment.
To benefit from this immunity, the employer must respond in writing to a written request from
a prospective employer, and any disclosed employee evaluations also must be in writing.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-119(c) (2000) (providing absolute immunity for such disclosures). In
Missouri, immunity attaches to written responses to written requests for references. Mo. REV.
STAT. § 290.152.2 (2000). The South Carolina statute requires a written request and written
response for immunity to apply to information other than dates of employment, pay level and
wage history. S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65(C) (Law Co-op Supp. 2000) (written employee eval-
uations; official personnel notices that record reasons for separation; voluntary or involuntary
release information; reasons for separation; and information regarding job performance). The
South Dakota legislation covers disclosure by employers in response to written requests of
prospective employers or employees, and further requires the employer to make a copy of the
written response available to the employee upon the employee's written request. S.D. CODi-
FIED LAWS § 60-4-12 (Michie Supp. 2001).
127 Mo. REV. STAT. § 290.152.3 (2000).
128 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 17.63(2) (West 2001).
129 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/10 (West Supp. 2001).
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generally. 130 The Indiana statute requires the prospective employer to
provide the copies to the employee.131
Writing requirements add a formality to the process that may im-
prove the quality of reference information and reduce the potential for
litigation. A written reference may be prepared more thoughtfully and
carefully than one given during a conversation, which may reduce the
possibility that a reference includes false or undocumented information.
In addition, an employee who receives a copy of a written reference may
have opportunities to correct or clarify information in discussions with
the reference provider or during interviews with prospective employers.
Having taken the time to prepare a written reference and to provide the
information to the employee also should demonstrate the seriousness and
good faith that the immunity requires. Additionally, written references
may abate evidentiary problems in the event that litigation arises. Thus,
the use of written references can serve to protect both employers and
employees, as well as serving a societal interest in promoting accuracy
and care. 32
G. OBTAINING THE EMPLOYEE'S WRITTEN CONSENT
The Arkansas statute conditions reference immunity on the em-
ployer acting in good faith and obtaining the written consent of the cur-
rent or former employee. 133 This written consent must be signed and
dated by the employee.' 34 The consent is valid only during the time the
prospective employer is actively considering the applicant, and is valid
for no longer than six months. 135
This consent requirement mirrors a strategy that many employers
adopted to defeat common law tort claims based on references: requiring
employees sign a release that authorizes the employer to give a reference.
Accordingly, many employers in Arkansas may already utilize releases
and will not have to alter their practices significantly when it comes to
130 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-114(5) (West Supp. 2001) (employer who provides
written information "shall send, upon the request of such current or former employee, a copy
of the information provided to the last known address of the person who is the subject of the
reference").
131 IND. CODE ANN.§ 22-5-3-1(c) (Michie 1997) ("Upon written request by the prospec-
tive employee, the prospective employer will provide copies of any written communications
from current or former employers that may affect the employee's possibility of employment
with the prospective employer.").
t32 Immunity statutes with a writing requirement, however, may cut against the objective
of encouraging references. Employers who believe a writing requirement is administratively
burdensome or time-consuming may opt instead to continue to follow "name, rank and serial
number" policies in lieu of relying on the qualified immunity.
133 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-3-204(a)(1) (Michie 2001). The statute specifically defines
the kind of information that may be included in a reference. See discussion supra at note 101.
134 ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-3-204(b)(2) (Michie 2001).
135 ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-3-204(b)(3) (Michie 2001).
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claiming the statutory immunity. However, the consent requirement may
trap the unwary employer. Consent must comply with the language of
the statute or the employer will not qualify for immunity. In addition,
good faith alone is not sufficient if the employer fails to obtain the requi-
site written consent. Consequent ly, employers in Arkansas need to know
not only that immunity may protect them, but that the protection is predi-
cated upon obtaining the employee's consent in the fashion mandated by
the statute.
The consent requirement raises concerns from the employee's per-
spective as well. The employee's consent should be fully informed.
This objective is met if employees who sign releases know the categories
of information that employers may provide under the statute. The statute
defines specific categories of information that may be disclosed in refer-
ences, 136 but the suggested consent language permits a broader authori-
zation to provide "information with regard to my employment."'137 This
raises the possibility that employees may not be aware of what is fair
game in an employment reference. Perhaps the consent forms could re-
fer to the statute or attach copies of the section describing the relevant
information. This additional step, which would pose only an incremental
burden for employers who already must obtain consent to benefit from
the immunity, would help protect employees who consent to disclosure.
H. CAUSES OF ACTION DEFEATED BY IMMUNITY
While concern about defamation liability sparked the growth of "no
comment" reference policies, reference immunity statutes cover other
causes of action as well. 138 Most statutes cover any form of civil liability
arising out of providing job references. Typical language protects em-
ployers who act in good faith from liability for disclosure of informa-
tion;139 disclosure or its consequences; 140 or disclosure and its
136 See discussion supra at note 101.
137 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-3-204(b)(1) (Michie 2001).
138 See, e.g., Long, supra note 23, at 900 (observing that although defamation claims are
primary concern of legislatures enacting reference immunity statutes, negative references may
also prompt claims for interference with business relations).
139 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.452 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-
65 (Law. Co-op Supp. 2000); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West Supp. 2002); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-119a(B)-(C) (2000); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 895.487(2) (West Supp. 2001) ("im-
mune from all civil liability that may result" [emphasis added]); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 4113.71(B) (Anderson 2001) ("not liable in damages in a civil action...").
140 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.160 (Michie 2000); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-
1361.C (West Supp. 2000); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-114(3) (West Supp. 2001); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709(a) (Supp. 2000); IDAHO CODE § 44-201(2) (Michie 1997); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 598 (West Supp. 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 61.A (West 1999);
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.178 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-12 (Michie Supp. 2001); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 34-42-1(1) (1997); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-1-113(a) (Michie 2001) (emphasis
added).
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consequences. 14 1 The language of a small number of statutes does not
confine immunity to civil actions. 142
Most statutes focus on the liability of the reference provider to the
person who is the subject of the reference. Immunity protects the dis-
closing employer from liability in tort and other civil actions brought by
that employee. Two states, Louisiana and Ohio, go further in their efforts
to protect employers from lawsuits arising out of job references.
The Louisiana statute extends immunity to prospective employers as
well as employers who provide references. To be protected, the disclos-
ing employer must provide the reference at the request of a prospective
employer or the employee and provide accurate information about the
employee's job performance or reasons for separation. 143 The protection
for prospective employers is unique to Louisiana's reference immunity
legislation. 144 The statute provides:
Any prospective employer who reasonably relies on in-
formation pertaining to an employee's job performance
or reasons for separation, disclosed by a former em-
ployer, shall be immune from civil liability including li-
ability for negligent hiring, negligent retention, and
other causes of action related to the hiring of said em-
ployee, based upon such reasonable reliance, unless fur-
ther investigation, including but not limited to a criminal
background check, is required by law.' 45
By expressly covering prospective employers as well as those who
give references, Louisiana's statutory scheme takes into account employ-
ers' growing concern over negligent hiring and related claims. Employ-
ers may face liability for negligent hiring or negligent retention when an
141 See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/10 (West Supp. 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-5-3-
1(b) Michie Supp. 2000); R.I. GEN LAWS § 28-6.4-1(c) (2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105
Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
142 N.M. STAT. ANN. §50-12-1 (Michie Supp. 2000); see also GA. CODE. ANN. § 34-1-4
(Supp. 2001) (immunity language set forth in statute's caption-"Employer immunity for dis-
closure of information regarding job performance"-but not in text of statute); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-423(a) (1998) ("may not be held liable for disclosing any infor-
mation about the job performance or the reason for termination of employment..."). The
language of these statutes provides a theoretically broad immunity that presumably extends to
potential criminal liability as well.
143 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291.A (West 1998). The disclosing employer is immune
from civil liability and other consequences of the disclosure, provided the employer did not act
in bad faith. An employer acts in bad faith by providing information that was "knowingly false
and deliberately misleading." Id. However, the provision requiring disclosure of "accurate"
information raises the possibility that an employer, who mistakenly-but in good faith-con-
veys false information, may not be protected. See discussion supra pp. 26-27.
144 My review of the statutes revealed no other state provides protection expressly for
prospective employers.
145 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291.B (West 1998) (emphasis added).
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employee injures someone, and the injured person can prove the harm
resulted from the employer's failure to carefully screen or supervise the
employee. 146 An employer's best strategy for avoiding negligent hiring
claims is to gather information regarding prospective employees. 147 The
Louisiana statute theoretically limits exposure to negligent hiring and re-
lated claims by providing immunity to hiring employers who reasonably
rely on information obtained in job references. Yet tension exists be-
tween the negligent hiring tort and the fear of defamation claims. Em-
ployers who wish to avoid defamation claims are likely to refuse to
provide references, thus undermining the safety concerns and incentives
for investigation underlying negligent hiring doctrine. 148
The impact of Louisiana's prospective employer protection will de-
pend on whether, as a result of the statute, employers provide useful ref-
erences. 149 Investigation is key to avoiding liability for negligent hiring,
however, "name, rank and serial number" references thwart prospective
employers' information gathering efforts. If those who give references
hold on to "name, rank and serial number" policies, the protection for
prospective employers will have little practical significance.
The Ohio statute does not limit its protection to actions by the em-
ployee who is the subject of the reference. The statute immunizes an
employer from liability to a "prospective employer, or any other person"
when the employer discloses information regarding an employee's job
performance at the request of the employee or a prospective employer. 150
Immunity extends to "any harm sustained as a proximate result of mak-
ing the disclosure or of any information disclosed .... ,,151 Accordingly,
employers who provide references in Ohio can look to the immunity stat-
ute to shield them from liability for misrepresentation, negligence, and
any other civil causes of action brought by a prospective employer or any
other person who may be harmed by the reference.1 52
146 See ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, § 1.12, at 27-28.
147 See, e.g., Saxton, supra note I, at 76.
148 See id. Saxton observes: "If many (perhaps a majority of) employers adopt "no com-
ment" reference policies, prospective employers of job applicants will often be frustrated in
their efforts to conduct responsible background checks, and the social safety policies on which
the 'negligent hiring' doctrine is grounded will likewise be undermined."
149 Cf. Aron, supra note 15, at 1156 (concluding that legislature may have included pro-
spective employer protection on the grounds that such protection "will increase the flow of
employment information because more prospective employers, desiring the immunity, may
request such information").
150 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4113.71(B) (Anderson 2001) (emphasis added).
151 Id.
152 Of course, the employer loses the immunity if the employee proves the reference was
false, deliberately misleading, in bad faith, or with malicious purpose. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4113.71(B)(1) (Anderson 2001). The employer also forfeits immunity for giving a reference
that violates Ohio discrimination laws. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71(B)(2) (Anderson
2001).
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This comprehensive protection, which addresses the full panoply of
possible causes of action arising out of job references, should signifi-
cantly reduce the risk that an employer will face liability for providing an
employment reference. If employers can be confident that immunity
statutes insulate them from liability from the range of actions that might
arise from a job reference, they may feel more comfortable with ex-
changing references.
I. PERSONS COVERED BY THE STATUTES
Obviously, the statutes will affect employers and the people who
work for them. What kind of organizations and what kind of workers fall
within the ambit of the statutes? Many statutes provide only general gui-
dance on the issue of who is defined as an employer or an employee.
Defining "employer" provides notice regarding the businesses, or-
ganizations, or entities eligible for the immunity. The definition also
may specify whether the immunity extends to managers and other agents
acting on an organization's behalf. Statutes may define "employer" by
describing the forms of business considered to be employers, such as
corporations or partnerships, or whether public sector employers are in-
cluded as well as those in the private sector. 153 Because a business acts
through its employees, definitions focusing solely on the nature of the
business fail to provide a fully useful definition. The people who pro-
vide references may be managers, supervisors, or other staff members in
human resources or personnel departments. The better definitions of
"employer" reflect this aspect of the workplace and include persons act-
ing on the employer's behalf.154 Whether the reference provider acts on
153 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4(a)(2) (Michie Supp. 2001) ("'Employer' means
any individual engaged in a business, corporation, S-corporation, limited liability company,
partnership, limited liability partnership, sole proprietorship, association, or government en-
tity."); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 17.63(l)(b) (West 2001) ("a person who employs an indi-
vidual for compensation or who supervises an individual providing labor as a volunteer");
MoNr. CODE ANN. § 27-1-737 (2001) (covering disclosures by a "nonpublic employer").
Some statutes also define "prospective employer." See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23:291.C(3) (West 1998) ("any 'employer' as defined herein, to which a prospective em-
ployee has made application, either oral or written, or forwarded a resume or other correspon-
dence expressing an interest in employment"); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 17.63(l)(c) (West
2001) ("a person to whom an employee or former employee has submitted an application for
employment").
154 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-114(4) (West Supp. 2001) (statute applies to
"any employee, agent, or other representative of the current or former employer who is author-
ized to provide and who provides information in accordance with this section"); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23:291.C(1) (West 1998) ("any person, firm, or corporation, including the state
and its political subdivisions, and their agents, that has one or more employees, or individuals
performing services under any contract of hire or service, expressed or implied, oral or writ-
ten") (emphasis added); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.755.4.(b) (Michie 1999) ("'Employer'
includes an employee or agent of an employer who is authorized by the employer to disclose
information regarding an employee") (emphasis added); OHIO REv. CODE. ANN.
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the employer's behalf can be a critical issue. For example, co-workers
may provide references for colleagues out of professional courtesy or
friendship; they also may provide information about colleagues to pro-
spective employers for similar reasons. Statutory definitions should
make clear that where the reference provider acts on her own, her em-
ployer should not be held responsible for her reference.
Defining "employee" provides notice regarding the categories of
workers whose ability to sue is limited by the reference immunity. Typi-
cally, the definitions are straightforward yet tautological, defining "em-
ployee" as a person who works for an employer. 55 Nevada includes
current and former employees in its definition. 156 A few statutes define
"prospective employee."' 57 Some statutes move beyond circular defini-
tions, covering persons who work for compensation, 158 or volunteers and
other unpaid workers as well. 159 Given the expanding use of indepen-
dent contractors and contingent workers in the modem workplace, statu-
tory definitions of "employee" also should indicate whether references
concerning part-time, temporary, and other contingent workers fall
within the immunity.
Only a small number of reference immunity statutes define the
terms "employer" and "employee." Statutes should not leave these key
§ 4113.71(A)(2) (Anderson 2001) ("the state, any political subdivision of the state, any person
employing one or more individuals in this state, and any person directly or indirectly acting in
the interest of the state, political subdivision, or such person") (emphasis added); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 41-1-65(A)(1) (Law Co-op Supp. 2000) ("[employers as defined] and their agents that
employ one or more employees. As used in this definition, 'agent' means any former supervi-
sor or the employer's designee") (emphasis added);. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.487(!)(b),
101.01 (4) (West Supp. 2001) (" . .. as well as any agent, manager, representative or other
person having control or custody of any employment, place of employment or of any em-
ployee.") (emphasis added).
155 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71(A)(1) (Anderson 2001) ("an individual
currently or formerly employed by an employer"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65(A)(2) (Law Co-
op Supp. 2000) ("any person employed by an employer").
156 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.755.4(a) (Michie 1999) ("'Employee' means a person
who currently renders or previously rendered time and services to an employer").
157 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291.C(4) (West 1998) ("any person who has
made an application, either oral or written, or has sent a resume or other correspondence
indicating an interest in employment"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65(A)(7) (Law Co-op Supp.
2000) ("any person who has made an application either oral or written or has sent a resume or
other correspondence to a prospective employer indicating an interest in employment"). South
Carolina includes a definition of "former employee" as well. § 41-1-65(A)(4) ("an individual
who was previously employed by an employer").
158 See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.487(l)(a), 101.01(3) (West Supp. 2001) ("'Em-
ployee' means any person who may be required or directed by any employer, in consideration
of direct or indirect gain or profit, to engage in any employment, or to go or work or be at any
time in any place of employment.").
159 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291.C(2) (West 1998) ("any person, paid or un-
paid, in the service of an employer") (emphasis added); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.451
(West 2001) ("an individual who as a volunteer or for compensation provides an employer
with his or her labor") (emphasis added).
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terms undefined. The statutes should define the categories of organiza-
tions that are protected when giving references as well as the categories
of workers who will be affected by the immunity.
J. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS: FEE-SHIFTING OR "LOSER PAYS"
PROVISIONS
The immunity statutes in Arizona and Ohio contain "loser pays" or
fee-shifting provisions, making it possible for prevailing parties in refer-
ence claims to recover attorney's fees and costs. 160 Providing for pay-
ment of the prevailing party's attorney's fees and costs by the losing
party contrasts the generally applicable "American rule" that parties pay
their own litigation costs. 161
Proponents of fee-shifting argue that a "loser pays" rule will have a
significant impact in changing employers' job reference practices. 162
Win or lose, the costs of defending a lawsuit can be substantial. Because
a defendant pays these substantial costs even if it ultimately prevails, the
American rule encourages employers to rely on "name, rank and serial
number" references to minimize the risk of litigation and its accompany-
ing expenses. 163 In contrast, fee-shifting, with its potential recovery of
legal fees, minimizes the risk of shouldering a large economic cost for
successful defense of legitimate reference practices. In addition, fee-
shifting can benefit employers by altering how potential plaintiffs ap-
proach litigation. Because a plaintiff faces the prospect of paying the
defendants' attorney's fees if she loses the lawsuit, the "loser pays" rule
should discourage frivolous claims. 164 For supporters of fee-shifting, re-
covery of legal expenses and a potentially reduced risk of suit combine to
provide an effective means for easing employers' fears regarding the
risks and costs of being sued.
The two state statutes featuring fee-shifting approach it in different
ways. The Arizona statute mandates that courts award attorney's fees and
160 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361.1 (West Supp. 2001); OHIo REv. CoDE ANN.
§ 4113.71(c) (Anderson 2001).
161 See, e.g., Saxton, supra note 1, at 76, 99; Adler & Peirce, supra note 2, at 1461-63.
162 See, e.g., Saxton, supra note 1, at 76.
163 See id. at 76, 99; Adler & Peirce, supra note 2, at 1461-63.
164 See Saxton, supra note 1, at 99 & n.162 (arguing that fee-shifting in litigation based
on unfavorable employment references will "discourage marginal claims"). Cf. Adler &
Peirce, supra note 2, at 1461 (interpreting "American Rule" to provide "ready access to the
courts even on novel and untested legal theories ... [and] this easier access ... means that
court dockets will include numerous frivolous lawsuits that consume enormous amounts of
time and waste many precious dollars of innocent defendants. This is particularly pertinent in
employment-reference cases involving allegations of defamation because most employers
eventually prevail, albeit often at great expense."). Id. at 1461-62.
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costs to any prevailing party in an employment reference lawsuit. 165
Under this approach, both plaintiffs and defendants who win reference
cases can recover the costs of litigation. In contrast, the Ohio statute's
"loser pays" provision benefits prevailing defendants only.166 Addition-
ally, the Ohio legislation does not mandate the award of attorney's fees
and costs in all cases. The fee-shift applies when the defendant prevails,
and the court determines that the plaintiff's claim is frivolous. 167 Moreo-
ver, the statute requires the court to determine whether the lawsuit is
frivolous in every case in which the jury decides in the defendant's
favor.16 8 If, after the mandated inquiry, the court decides the case is
frivolous, the court then has discretion to order the plaintiff to pay the
defendant's reasonable attorney's fees and costs.169
The language of the Ohio statute, which shifts fees only when the
defendant prevails, is more accurately characterized as a "plaintiff pays,"
rather than a "loser pays" scheme. Apparently, concern over frivolous
lawsuits drove the Ohio legislature to craft an unbalanced fee-shifting
provision, heavily weighted toward the interests of employers. In con-
trast, the Arizona statute, which permits any prevailing party to recover
attorney's fees and costs, creates a fee-shifting mechanism with incen-
tives for employees and employers alike. The prospect of paying the
prevailing party's litigation costs can discourage plaintiffs from pursuing
165 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361.1 (West Supp. 2001) (providing that "[a] court shall
award court costs, attorney fees and other related expenses to any party that prevails in any
civil proceeding in which a violation of [the reference immunity law] is alleged.") (emphasis
added).
166 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71(C) (Anderson 2001) (stating that the court may or-
der the plaintiff to pay the prevailing defendant's attorney's fees and court costs, but the statute
does not provide for a prevailing plaintiff to recover attorney's fees and costs from the
defendant).
167 Section 4113.71(C) provides:
If the court finds that the verdict of the jury was in favor of the defendant, the court
shall determine whether the lawsuit ... constituted frivolous conduct as defined in
division (A) of section 2323.51 of the Revised Code. If the court finds by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the lawsuit constituted frivolous conduct, it may order
the plaintiff to pay reasonable attorney's fees and court costs of the defendant.
OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 4113.71(C) (Anderson 2001).
Section 2323.51(A) of the Ohio Revised Code defines frivolous conduct as follows:
(1) "Conduct" means filing a civil action, asserting a claim, defense, or other posi-
tion in connection with a civil action, or taking any other action in connection with a
civil action.
(2) "Frivolous conduct" means conduct of a party to a civil action or of his counsel
of record that satisfies either of the following:
(a)(i) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the
civil action;
(a)(ii) It is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith
argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2323.51(A)(l)-(2) (Anderson 2001).
168 OHiO REV. CODE. ANN. § 4113.71(C) (Anderson 2001) (emphasis added).
169 See id.
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frivolous claims, discourage defendants from stonewalling with weak de-
fenses, and encourage all parties to seriously consider settlement. If fee-
shifting accomplishes these or similar objectives, reference claims can be
resolved in an expeditious and cost-effective manner. 170
Notwithstanding the arguments supporting fee-shifting, no legisla-
tures other than those in Arizona and Ohio have included "loser pays"
provisions in reference immunity statutes. Perhaps the practical con-
cerns, potential overreach and unfairness, and other problems inherent in
fee-shifting outweigh its theoretical appeal.
Compelling losers to pay prevailing parties' fees may be easier said
than done. It is unlikely that many plaintiffs will have financial re-
sources sufficient to pay a prevailing defendant's attorney's fees. The
promise of relief for prevailing employers therefore is symbolic at best,
so few employers will view a statutory fee-shifting provision as an ade-
quate incentive to make the switch from "name, rank and serial number"
to more open reference practices. Moreover, the fee-shifting proposal
does not account for lost time and other non-compensable costs-such as
negative impact on employee morale or adverse publicity for the em-
ployer's business-that can flow from litigation. While attorney's fees
certainly form a large portion of the economic costs of litigation, con-
cerns regarding lost time and other costs also underlie employers' fear of
lawsuits. 171 In the best case scenario, a plaintiff may be able to pay the
prevailing employer's fees, but she cannot reimburse the employer for
the lost time and other negative impacts inherent even in a successful
defense.
Discouraging frivolous lawsuits against employers is a key objec-
tive for providing that losing plaintiffs pay the fees of prevailing defend-
ants. Here, fee-shifting mechanisms may overreach, discouraging
meritorious as well as frivolous claims. The specter of paying employ-
ers' legal fees may lead potential plaintiffs to forego legitimate chal-
lenges to illegal reference practices especially given that not all losing
plaintiffs lose because their claims are frivolous. Consequently, judicial
discretion will be critical in limiting the award of fees to cases where
justice requires such an award.
170 Academic writers also support fee-shifting mechanisms as keys to changing employ-
ers' reference practices. See, e.g., Saxton, supra note 1, at 100-07; Adler & Peirce, supra note
2, at 1461-63; Long, supra note 12, at 220-21; Schainblatt, supra note 15, at 740-41.
171 See, e.g., 0. Lee Reed & Jan W. Henkel, Facilitating the Flow of Truthful Personnel
Information: Some Needed Change in the Standard to Overcome the Qualified Privilege to
Defame, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 305, 318 (1988). As Reed & Henkel observe: "[T]he fear of litiga-
tion which leads employers to turn off the spigot of employee-related information is a reasona-
ble response from the employers' viewpoint. Litigation itself is an inefficient, costly, time-
consuming process. Even when ... defendants win, they lose, given the resource commit-
ments required by even successful litigation." Id.
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In short, any benefits to be gained from fee-shifting are likely to be
outweighed by its negative consequences. It is not surprising, then, that
"loser pays" provisions have not been included in the reference immunity
statutes of most states. Unless the practical experience in Arizona and
Ohio demonstrates otherwise, fee-shifting should remain outside the
mainstream of reference immunity statutes.
K. RELATIONSHIP TO COMMON LAW
In many ways, the reference immunity statutes mirror elements of
the common law qualified privilege, and the emerging case law views the
legislation as a codification of existing common law principles. 172 In
early cases, courts have used both statutory and common law privileges
to adjudicate reference claims. 173 Employers also may rely on the com-
mon law privilege in cases in which the facts do not fall within the stat-
ute's requirements. 174
Opponents of immunity statutes criticize the statutes as unnecessary
duplications of existing, and more than adequate, common law protec-
tions for employers.' 75 Advocates for employees argue that the legisla-
tion over-emphasizes the rights of employers at the expense of
employees. 176 In addition, the legislative overlap with pre-existing com-
mon law privilege potentially brings confusion to the law and to the
workplace.
Only six states-Arizona, Arkansas, Maine, Ohio, Oklahoma and
Utah-address the interaction between the statutory immunity and ex-
isting common law principles relating to job references.177 In Arizona
172 See, e.g., Linafelt v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc., 745 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1999); Thomas v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 761 So. 2d 401, 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000). See discussion infra at pp. 47-49.
173 See, e.g., Deutsch v. Chesapeake Ctr., 27 F.Supp. 2d 642, 645 (D. Md. 1998); Davis v.
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 987 P.2d 1172, 1182; Bernofsky v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund,
No. 98-1792, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5561 (E.D. La. Apr. 18, 2000), affd 253 F.3d 700 (5th
Cir. 2001). See discussion infra pp. 50-54. -
174 See, e.g., Darvish v. Gohari, 745 A.2d 1134, 1139 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); see
discussion infra pp. 56-57.
175 See, e.g., Sturgeon, supra note 49, at 2 (arguments of opponents that protection al-
ready exists in court decisions); Backover, supra note 49, at 1 (according to trial lawyers and
organized labor, reference immunity legislation constitutes "unnecessary repetition of Texas
common law").
176 See, e.g., Hicks, supra note 42, at 16 (reporting comments from Gordon McDonald of
Nebraska AFL-CIO that immunity statute tips balance "too far in employers' favor"); Wyo-
ming References Law Could Hurt Employees, 11 INDIV. EMPL. RIGHTS (BNA) 19 (July 30,
1996) (statute "gives protection to employers and not employees") (quoting Wyoming state
Rep. Kenilynn Zanetti).
177 See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361.D (West Supp. 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § I1-
3.204(d)(2) (Michie 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 598 (West Supp. 2000); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 41173.71D (Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 62.C (West 1999);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-42-1 (1997).
[Vol. 11: 1
JOB REFERENCE IMMUNITY STATUTES
and Utah, the statutes provide that the statutory immunity does not alter
any existing common law privileges. 178 Consequently, these statutes
make clear that employers in Arizona and Utah can assert common law
privileges as well as the privilege provided in the statutes. Retaining the
common law privilege provides an added measure of protection for em-
ployers. Employers who fail to meet the requirements for statutory im-
munity will be able to assert common law privileges that do not have
technical requirements. 79 While this is good news for employers, the
overlap adds potential confusion and complexity to the litigation of job
reference claims. '80
In Arkansas and Maine, immunity statutes coexist with potential
common law claims for employees as well as common law privileges for
employers. The Arkansas statute provides that except as specifically
amended by the statute, "the common law of this state remains un-
changed as it relates to providing employment information on present
and former employees."' 181 Given the stringent requirements of the Ar-
kansas statute, such as obtaining the employee's written consent for dis-
closure of specifically defined categories of information, a broad range
of job reference cases in Arkansas most likely will be governed by com-
mon law principles. Outside the specific parameters of the statute, em-
ployees retain the right to bring common law tort claims, and employers
can assert common law privileges.
The Maine statute leads to a similar result, although the language is
less straightforward than the Arkansas statute. Maine's statute provides,
"[t]his section is supplemental to and not in derogation of any claims
available to the former employee that exist under state law and any pro-
tections that are already afforded employers under state law."', 82 Be-
cause the statute provides that a claim under the immunity law "is
supplemental to common law," by implication both statutory and com-
mon law claims are available. 183 The use of the phrase "not in deroga-
tion of' also supports this conclusion-the statute does not diminish an
employee's common-law right to sue an employer. 184 Accordingly, it
appears that tort claims remain an option for employees in Maine who
receive unfavorable job references. In addition, employers retain their
common law protections and privileges after the enactment of the Maine
178 See ARiz. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361.D (West Supp. 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-
42-1(5) (1997).
179 See discussion infra at p. 58-60.
180 See discussion infra at p. 59 where the problems of applying the statutory immunity
and the common law qualified privilege in the same case are considered.
181 ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-3-204(d)(2) (Michie 2001).
182 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 598 (West Supp. 2000).
183 Id.
184 Id.
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immunity statute. Given the supplemental and non-diminishing status of
the new law, it is difficult to conceive how the immunity statute clarifies
the law, or affords significant protection to employers contemplating the
litigation risks now inherent in providing job references.
In Oklahoma, the statute provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any
provision of this section does not give rise to any liability or causes of
action which did not exist prior to the effective date of this section. 18 5
This provision also implies that common law claims coexist with the
statute, and plaintiffs may bring a common law claim, so long as they are
not trying to create a new cause of action. By precluding new causes of
action or theories of liability, the statute avoids creating an affirmative
duty to provide references. Beyond this, however, plaintiffs are free to
base their claims on the common law. However, the statute does not
indicate whether a defense to common law claims exists. By leaving
open the possibility of being sued under the common law, the legislature
has limited the statute's effectiveness as an incentive for employers to
adopt open reference policies.
The Ohio statute comprehensively addresses the relationship be-
tween statute and common law. Subsection 4113.71.D of the Ohio Re-
vised Code provides:
(1) This section does not create a new cause of action or
substantive legal right against an employer.
(2) This section does not affect any immunities from
civil liability or defenses established by another sec-
tion of the Revised Code or available at common
law to which an employer may be entitled under cir-
cumstances not covered by this section.186
Subsections (1) and (2) reinforce the nature of the statute as a shield
for employers who provide references. By emphasizing that the statute
creates no new causes of action or substantive legal right against employ-
ers, subsection (1) makes it clear that the statute's purpose is to protect
reference providers, rather than provide new avenues for lawsuits by ag-
grieved employees, prospective employers and other claimants who be-
lieve they have suffered harm arising out of an employment reference.
Similarly, by stating that employers retain all common law immunities
and defenses in circumstances not covered by the statute, subsection (2)
accentuates the legislation's purpose as an employer protection mea-
sure.187 This section also clarifies that the statute does not abrogate com-
185 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 61(C) (West 1999).
186 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.71(D) (Anderson 2001).
187 Compare the relationship section with the fee-shifting provision, see discussion supra
pp. 37-40. The comparison underscores that the Ohio statute is very much weighted toward
the interests of employers.
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mon law defenses in circumstances not covered by the immunity law.
For example, an employer who volunteers reference information rather
than responding to a prospective employer's request would not be pro-
tected by the statutory immunity. In that situation, the employer would
be able to assert existing common law defenses to the reference claim.
The immunity statute appears designed for a narrow, prescribed set of
circumstances, with situations outside of the statute governed by the
common law.
Except for the statutes discussed in this section, reference immunity
legislation does not address the relationship between the statutory and
common law causes of action. Case law may provide some guidance.
Thus far, Florida courts provide the clearest direction, holding that the
statute applies to statements about "job performance" and common law
privileges apply to other communications in the workplace. 188 Other
cases analyzing state reference immunity statutes have not addressed the
interaction or relationship between the statutory and common law
privileges. 189
Although the statutes intend to decrease the threat of litigation, pro-
viding concurrent statutory and common law privileges and remedies has
the opposite effect. Neither employers nor employees will have a clear
understanding regarding whether legislation or common law controls in a
job reference case. If that is the case, we can expect increasing complex-
ity in job reference cases, with plaintiffs and defendants alleging multiple
and duplicative theories under the common law and under the statutes.
Moreover, most of the statutes offer little more than a codification
of the common law defamation privileges. For example, in Florida-one
of the earliest states to adopt an immunity statute-the courts explicitly
have labeled the statute as "the Legislature's codification of the common
law."'190 These longstanding, preexisting common law privileges have
been ineffective in reducing employers' fear of being sued. Codifying
similar privileges is unlikely to encourage significant changes in prevail-
ing reference practices. In addition, where the relationship between the
statutes and the common law remains unclear, confusion is the likely
result. 191
188 Linafelt, 745 So. 2d at 388; see also Thomas, 761 So. 2d at 405; see discussion infra
pp. 47-49.
189 See discussion infra pp. 58-60.
190 Linafelt, 745 So. 2d at 388. See also Thomas, 761 So. 2d at 405 (referring to statute as
"the legislative codification of the common law qualified privilege in defamation cases as it
relates to comments about job performance").
191 See Linafelt, 745 So. 2d at 389. In that case, issues of statutory and common law
privilege were submitted to the jury. In reaching its verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the jury
did not address the statute's higher standard of proof, which was a controlling issue in the case.
Both the trial court and appellate court noted that "there was a great deal of confusion at trial
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To promote clarity in the law for both employers and employees
and to further the goal of encouraging employers to provide references,
the immunity statutes should serve as the exclusive law governing the
employer's qualified privilege in job reference cases. 192 The legislatures
should not wait for the courts' interpretations. The statutes should state
this expressly.
IV. REFERENCE IMMUNITY STATUTES: A GROWING TREND
WITH NO IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT
REFERENCE PRACTICES
A. THE ENDURING POWER OF "NAME, RANK, AND SERIAL NUMBER"
Since 1995, legislatures have looked to reference immunity statutes
as the antidote to the problem of "name, rank and serial number" refer-
ences. Armed with the statutory shield, employers would freely provide
references upon request. Anecdotal reports from the states, however,
suggest otherwise. Recent articles in law journals, human resource man-
agement publications, and legal newsletters indicate only minor-if
any-changes in the advice given to employers in states with immunity
statutes. 193 Despite the growing number of immunity statutes, many em-
ployers continue to believe the wisest course is to provide nothing more
than "name, rank and serial number" when responding to requests for
references. In interviews with personnel managers, Halbert and Maltby
found that "the hiring professionals we spoke to . . . repeatedly told us
that the fear of being sued remains as strong as ever" in states with refer-
ence immunity statutes. 94 Regarding the effectiveness of the immunity
laws, Halbert and Maltby concluded that "at this point, the laws appear to
be having little or no effect." 195 Other scholars and journalists have
reached similar conclusions.196
concerning the common law and statutory privileges and that the jury's verdict was, in part, a
product of this confusion," id. at 389, n. 1.
192 See also Aron, supra note 15, at 1164. Aron's suggestions for reform of the Louisiana
immunity statute include amending the statute to provide that it "is the exclusive remedy and is
not supplemental to any protections that are already afforded employers under state law," id.
With the statute as the exclusive remedy for job reference cases, "a unified body of case law
[could] develop in this area of the law, in that the parties must use the statutory protections and
immunities to the exclusion of the former case law." Id.
193 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
194 Halbert & Maltby, supra note 1, at 411.
195 Id. The authors' assertions were based on surveys on reference checking and the au-
thors' interviews with hiring professionals.
196 See, e.g., Verkerke, supra note 2, at 132 (arguing that the statutes are a modest reform
and do little to change the status quo, and that "a plain reading of the language commonly used
in these statutes suggests that dramatic change is unlikely."); Ellen Forman, Truth or Conse-
quences: Divulging a Former Employee's Unacceptable Work Performance Can Open a Pan-
dora's Box for Any Company, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 6, 1997, at 3, 1997 WL
3078681 (observing that although Florida has a reference immunity statute, "many companies
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Why do the statutes have virtually no impact on employers' refer-
ence practices or the advice that employers receive from lawyers and
human resource professionals? The objective of statutory immunity is to
shield employers from liability, thereby encouraging employers to give
references. For a number of reasons, meeting this objective may be more
difficult than legislators anticipated.
While the statutes do offer immunity from liability, this protection
may not be sufficient for many employers who are concerned with avoid-
ing lawsuits or threatened lawsuits. For these employers, the promise of
immunity from liability fails to adequately address their concerns about
the costs of being sued, even though immunity can strengthen the odds
that the employer ultimately prevails. As one attorney has observed, a
reference immunity statute "is pretty good legal protection to win the
lawsuit, but it's not protection from being sued."197 Consequently, as the
following advice from an industry newsletter indicates, employers and
their advisors may not be convinced that the statutes provide reliable
protection:
[D]on't rely on job reference immunity statutes - legis-
lation to immunize employers who provide references
for former employees. These rules generally require that
the employer act in "good faith" and provide only "truth-
ful" information. Such ambiguous language ... hasn't
yet been tested, and employers may still get into litiga-
tion over negative or incomplete references.198
In any event, employers most likely would prefer not to be the de-
fendant in a case testing the scope of statutory immunity. Moreover, the
immunity is not likely to be perceived by employers as providing addi-
tional protection in the event of a lawsuit. For the most part, the statutes
are still sticking to confirmation of employment, position, dates of employment and salary");
Jeff Richgels, Giving References Has Become a Sticky Wicket, MADISON CAPITAL TIMES, Feb.
12, 1997, at IC ("while the [Wisconsin reference immunity statute] may prevent someone
from winning a suit it doesn't prevent them from bringing one... [w]hich is a big incentive to
stick to name, rank and serial number"); Ron Carter, Mum's Still the Word: New Law Hasn't
Shaken Loose Employee Reference Information, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 23, 1996, at I
(observing that "there is little evidence yet that much has changed" in employment reference
practices since the passage of the Ohio reference immunity statute).
197 Ellen Forman, supra note 196, at 3 (quoting Allan Weitzman, a labor attorney in Boca
Raton, Florida).
198 References - Walking a Thin Legal Line; Industry Trend or Event, OFFICE SOLuTiONS,
Jan. 1, 2001, at 9. For similarly skeptical views, see, e.g., Steven Oberbeck, Employers Still
Cautious About Giving References: Past is Taboo for Employers Despite Law, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Oct. 6, 1996, at El; Sixel, supra note 90, at 1 (discussing a lawyer's testimony in
support of Texas reference immunity legislation, and noting he would continue to advise his
clients who wished to avoid litigation to "not say anything about their former employees other
than their dates of service and position held" even after passage of statute).
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mirror and codify the common law privilege, a privilege which has been
ineffective in deterring the use of "name, rank and serial number" poli-
cies. The language of the statutes also provides grounds for caution and
skepticism among employers. Some statutes state that the new laws do
not abrogate any common law rights to sue. 199 Legislative silence on
this issue leaves courts with the task of deciding whether plaintiffs may
bring common law claims as well as statutory ones.200 The possibility
that an employer may face both statutory and common law claims in a
job reference case is unlikely to give employers confidence that the stat-
utes protect them. Moreover, even if the statutes are effective, many
employers-particularly small businesses and others without ongoing re-
lationships with lawyers or human resource professionals-may be una-
ware of their existence. 20 1 This combination of factors hardly bodes well
for a sea of change in reference practices in the workplace.
The statutes, of course, are a relatively recent legal development.
With the passage of time, perhaps employers may become increasingly
aware of the statutes and more willing to rely on the immunity. A few
well-publicized job reference cases in which employers prevail by invok-
ing the statutory immunity may convince employers that the statutes in-
deed protect them. Equally important are efforts to educate employers
about the statutes. Media and business and professional organizations
should take part in getting information to employers so that employers
are aware of how the statutes can protect them.
While increasing employers' knowledge and awareness of the stat-
utes is a start, changing employers' reference practices may yet require
more than knowledge of the statutes and well-publicized employer victo-
ries. Given the choice between avoiding litigation and winning a case
because of qualified immunity, however, most employers would likely
choose to avoid litigation altogether. Immunity statutes notwithstanding,
employers who do not want to risk litigation are likely to continue to take
the safest route by adhering to "name, rank and serial number" and neu-
tral reference policies for the foreseeable future.
B. CASE LAW INTERPRETATIONS OF REFERENCE IMMUNITY STATUTES
Most reference immunity statutes have been in effect for a relatively
short time. Consequently, only a small number of reported cases cite
reference immunity statutes. Appellate courts have discussed reference
199 See supra notes 181-186 and accompanying text.
200 Cf. Peter Tiersma, The Language of Silence, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 87 (1995) (dis-
cussing legal significance of legislative silence in statutory interpretation and observing that
"congressional silence intentionally or unintentionally creates a gap that the courts must some-
how fill").
201 See Cooper, supra note 2, at 313.
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immunity statutes in six states that were among the first to enact refer-
ence immunity legislation: Florida (statute in effect since in 1991); Indi-
ana (statute in effect since 1995); New Mexico (statute in effect since
1995); Tennessee (statute in effect since 1995); Maryland (statute in ef-
fect since 1996); and Iowa (statute in effect since 1997). In addition,
three federal district courts have decided cases involving reference im-
munity statutes. 20 2
Florida
The case law review begins with Florida, the first state legislature to
enact a reference immunity statute.20 3 Florida courts interpret the statute
as an affirmative defense to claims arising out of job references. 204
Common law privileges govern lawsuits based on workplace communi-
cations other than job references. 20 5
For example, in Linafelt v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc.,20 6
William Linafelt alleged defamation and intentional interference with a
business relationship after receiving a negative employment reference.20 7
A prospective employer testified that Beverly Enterprise provided a ref-
erence stating that Linafelt had committed a "conduct violation." As a
result of this "conduct violation," Beverly declared Linafelt ineligible for
rehire and barred him from its premises. 20 8 While the jury decided in
Linafelt's favor, the trial court granted Beverly's motion for directed ver-
dict.20 9 Linafelt appealed.
In its analysis of Linafelt's defamation claim, the Florida court of
appeal stated the case was governed by the reference immunity statute
because the alleged defamatory communication related to Linafelt's "job
performance. ' 210 Describing the statute as "the Legislature's codifica-
tion of the common law," the court noted that the statute provides an
affirmative defense to a claim arising out of a job reference. 211 The court
202 These courts have interpreted the reference immunity statutes of Louisiana and Mary-
land. See discussion infra pp. 50-51 and 53-56.
203 The analysis necessarily is preliminary given the currently small number of reported
cases. I believe, however, that examining the current state of the case law provides a founda-
tion for considering the potential impact of immunity statutes on job reference claims.
204 See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
205 See infra notes 215-219 and accompanying text.
206 Linafelt v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc., 745 So. 2d at 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999).
207 Id. at 388. Linafelt's suit also included a cause of action for breach of employment
contract. The contract claim was dismissed. Id. (citing Linafelt v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida,
Inc., 662 So. 2d 986) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
208 Id. at 387-88.
209 The trial court also denied Linafelt's motion for a new trial on the issue of punitive
damages. Id.
210 Id. at 388.
211 Id.
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emphasized that the statute, with its clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard, places a higher burden of proof on plaintiffs in reference cases than
the burden imposed under the common law for cases that do not involve
references. 212 The court found that the jury ,had received incorrect in-
structions on the common law and statutory privileges. The jury deter-
mined the "conduct violation" statement was not related to job
performance and thus did not address whether Linafelt had established,
with clear and convincing evidence, Beverly's lack of good faith. In a
footnote, the court observed "the trial court recognized that there was a
great deal of confusion at the trial concerning the common law and statu-
tory privileges and that the jury's verdict was, in part, a product of this
confusion. ' 21 3 In any event, the court found that the "conduct violation"
statement was true, and affirmed the directed verdict in Beverly's favor
on the defamation claim.214
The court expressed similar concerns regarding the jury's failure to
apply the clear and convincing evidence standard in assessing Linafelt's
claim for intentional interference with business relations. Noting that the
jury had not rendered its verdict "under the controlling law" that required
a showing of clear and convincing evidence, the court remanded the case
for a new trial on the tortious interference claim.2 15
The Florida court of appeal again analyzed the statutory and com-
mon law privileges in Thomas v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc. 2 16 Charles
Thomas sued Tampa Bay Downs racetrack and the Thoroughbred Racing
Protective Bureau for defamation. Thomas based his defamation action
on two incidents. First, Thomas alleged he was defamed by statements
made in a report prepared by the racetrack's director of security and dis-
seminated to members of the Protective Bureau. 217 Second, Thomas
claimed he was defamed by statements allegedly made by the security
director to a prospective employer who had requested a job reference. 218
The defendants' affirmative defenses included qualified privilege.
The court applied the common law privilege to the circulation of the
212 Id. at 388-89.
213 Id. at 389 n.I.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 390.
216 Thomas v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 761 So. 2d 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
217 Id. at 403. The report detailed allegations that Thomas had made false representations
and "duped" a woman who responded to an employment classified ad. In his complaint,
Thomas also charged that the director of security, Robert Kibbey, was "spreading rumors that
[Thomas] had transported three women to the Crescent City for immoral and improper pur-
poses." Id.
218 Id. In an affidavit, the prospective employer asserted Kibbey told him that Thomas
"had run an advertisement seeking female trainers, whom he then transported to New Orleans
and pimped for their services." Id. The affidavit also stated that Kibbey said Thomas "had
engaged in identical conduct with his former wife." Kibbey denied making the statements
alleged. Id.
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report to the Protective Bureau and affirmed summary judgment in favor
of the defendants. 219 However, with respect to the job reference claim,
the court held that factual questions existed as to whether the statements
had been made. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment, but
it noted that if the jury found that the security director had made the
alleged statements in good faith, he would be protected by the statute.220
The court again described the statute as "the legislative codification of
the common law of qualified privilege in defamation cases" that "relates
to comments about job performance which are presumed to have been
made in good faith." 221
Indiana
An Indiana appellate court analyzed the state reference immunity
statute in Steele v. McDonald's Corp.222 Victor Steele sued McDonald's,
alleging that McDonald's disclosed his status as a convicted felon in vio-
lation of a promise to keep the information confidential. The events
leading up to the disclosure began with a fight between Steele and a co-
worker at McDonald's. Steele maintained the co-worker attacked him,
and Steele fought back only in self-defense. McDonald's fired Steele,
and he subsequently obtained a job at a Kroger grocery store. He did not
inform Kroger that he had a felony conviction, but an unidentified Mc-
Donald's employee informed the Kroger security office that Steele was a
convicted felon. Kroger then fired Steele.223
Steele, a pro se litigant, alleged fraud against McDonald's for
breaching a promise to keep his felon status confidential. The court
quickly disposed of Steele's fraud claim and affirmed the trial court's
grant of judgment on the pleadings. Observing that the misrepresenta-
tions alleged by Steele were "'not the stuff of which a fraud recovery is
made,"' the court also held that the Indiana reference immunity statute
protected McDonald's from civil liability for the disclosure of the truth-
ful information concerning Steele's felon status. 224
219 Id. at 404-05.
220 Id. at 405.
221 Id.
222 Steele v. McDonald's Corp., 686 N.E.2d 137 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
223 Id. at 140-41.
224 Id. at 141-43. Some reference immunity statutes do not protect disclosures of confi-
dential information. Under those statutes, disclosure of confidential information rebuts the
presumption of good faith. See discussion supra, at Part III.B.3. While Steele may have fared
better in a state with a confidentiality provision, it is not clear whether he had sufficient facts
to support his claim that McDonald's had promised him confidentiality.
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Louisiana
In Louisiana, one court discussed the state reference immunity stat-
ute without providing detailed analysis. In Bernofsky v. Administrators
of Tulane Educational Fund,225 Dr. Carl Bernofsky sued his former em-
ployer, Tulane University Medical School ("Tulane"), for defamation
and other claims arising out of requests for employment references. 22 6
Bernofsky had a history of litigation against Tulane, having unsuccess-
fully sued the medical school for race discrimination, age discrimination
and a number of state law claims arising out from his termination. 227
While the wrongful discharge litigation was pending in the district court,
Bernofsky applied for other jobs and listed the names of faculty members
at Tulane as references.2 28
In response to a reference inquiry from the University of Houston,
the faculty members referred the request to Tulane's in-house counsel,
who responded with a carefully worded letter. The letter explained that,
due to Bernofsky's pending litigation, counsel had directed the faculty
members to not respond to reference requests concerning Dr. Bernofsky.
The text of the letter provided, in pertinent part:
I have directed Dr. Karam that [he and other faculty
members] should not respond to any request relative to
Dr. Bernofsky because of pending litigation brought by
Dr. Bernofsky against Dr. Karam personally and against
the University.
I can confirm that Dr. Bernofsky was a research profes-
sor at Tulane whose position was eliminated because Dr.
Bernofsky no longer had any research funds to support
his position. His dismissal was not based on any per-
formance issues, but was strictly a financial decision due
to lack of research funds.
Lack of a response from [the faculty members] person-
ally should not indicate any negative information rela-
225 Bernofsky v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, No. 98-1792, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5561 (E.D. La. Apr. 18, 2000), affd 253 F.3d 700 (5th Cir. 2001).
226 Bernofsky's lawsuit also claimed that Tulane's conduct regarding employment refer-
ences constituted retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Id. at *2.
227 Id. Bemofsky's termination claims were dismissed on summary judgment, and that
judgment subsequently was affirmed on appeal. Bemofsky v. Tulane Univ. Med. Sch., 962 F.
Supp. 895, 897 (E.D. La. 1997), aff'd, 136 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 1998).
228 Bernofsky v. Adm'rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, No. 98-1792, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5561, at *9-10 (E.D. La. Apr. 18, 2000). The court noted that Bernofsky listed the faculty
members as references "without requesting their permission or even notifying them that he had
done so." Id. Moreover, Bemofsky's complaint included "pervasive, specific and personal"
allegations against Dr. Jim Karam, one of the persons whom Bernofsky listed as a reference.
Id. at *8-9.
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tive to Dr. Bernofsky, but is necessitated because of the
pending litigation.229
Bernofsky argued that the letter was inaccurate to the extent that it
indicated that he had sued Dr. Karam personally and that there were no
research funds to support his position.230 The court, applying Louisiana
law, disagreed, finding that the remarks were neither inaccurate nor de-
famatory. 231 Further, the court found that even if the remarks were false
and defamatory, Tulane still prevailed on the grounds of qualified privi-
lege. Tulane asserted both the common law privilege and the privilege
under the state reference immunity statute. With regard to the common
law privilege, the court found that Bernofsky failed to prove malice and
that the statements were made in good faith.232 The court concluded its
opinion by addressing Tulane's argument that it was entitled to protec-
tion under the reference immunity statute and Bernofsky's counterargu-
ment that the statutory immunity was not available. Although the court
quoted language from the statute,233 the opinion furnishes no specific
analysis of the statute or its role in the outcome of the case.2 34 Thus,
while Tulane prevailed on summary judgment, the opinion provides little
guidance for courts and litigants in future cases involving the Louisiana
reference immunity statute.
229 Id. at *10-11.
230 Id. at *32-33.
231 Id. at *32.
232 Id. at *35-36.
233 The court quoted LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291A (West 1998), which provides:
Any employer that, upon request by a prospective employer or a current or former
employee, provides accurate information about a current or former employee's job
performance or reasons for separation shall be immune from civil liability and other
consequences of such disclosure provided such employer is not acting in bad faith.
An employer shall be considered to be acting in bad faith only if it can be shown by
a preponderance of the evidence that the information disclosed was knowingly false
and deliberately misleading.
Id. at *36-37.
234 By the conclusion of the opinion, the court seems exasperated with the litigious Dr.
Bernofsky. The court writes:
Bernofsky argues that [the statutory] immunity is not available to Tulane because
there is an issue of fact as to whether the statements made by [in-house counsel]
were accurate or knowingly false and deliberately misleading. He then provides
seven pages of familiar fact to establish that Bemofsky's academic performance was
not unsatisfactory and that he did not consistently fail to generate grant funds prior to
his termination at Tulane.
Dr. Bemofsky may have a deep-seated and heartfelt need to relitigate the issue of
why he was terminated at Tulane. However, his opportunity has come and gone. He
can not resurrect the issue in the carefully worded letter from Tulane to Bemofsky's
friend at UH ....
Id. at *37.
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New Mexico
The New Mexico Court of Appeals cited the statute in its analysis of
Davis v. Board of County Commissioners.235 Plaintiff Mariah Davis al-
leged that while she was a patient at Mesilla Valley Hospital, Joseph
Herrera, a mental health technician at the hospital, physically abused,
sexually assaulted, and sexually harassed her.236 Herrera's former em-
ployer, defendant Dona Ana County Detention Center, had given Herrera
an unqualified, favorable reference when he applied for his job at the
hospital. The Detention Center recommended Herrera without qualifica-
tion even though the Detention Center had investigated and disciplined
Herrera for repeated instances of sexual harassment.2 37 Davis sued the
County for negligent misrepresentation, alleging that misleading infor-
mation in the reference led the hospital to hire Herrera, and as a result,
Hererra assaulted Davis. 238 The events in Davis, however, occurred
before the statute took effect. Because the statute does not apply retroac-
tively, the statute did not govern the Davis case. 239 While the court ulti-
mately "[did] not construe the statute's meaning because it [was] not
directly before [the court]," the court observed that the New Mexico stat-
ute "would appear to track much of the common-law privilege relating to
defamation and good-faith comments in the employment context. 24°
Tennessee
The Tennessee Supreme Court interpreted the state reference immu-
nity statute in Sullivan v. Baptist Memorial Hospital.24' Plaintiff Karen
Sullivan sued her former employer for defamation, relying on the theory
of compelled self-publication. 242 The sole issue before the court was
235 Davis v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 987 P.2d 1172 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).
236 Id. at 1175.
237 id, at 1175-77.
238 Id. at 1176.
239 Id. at 1181-82.
240 Id. at 1182.
241 Sullivan v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp., 995 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. 1999).
242 Id. at 541. Defamation generally requires that the defendant communicate a defama-
tory statement to a third party - that is, to someone other than the plaintiff. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION §§ 4.12[t],
15.02[l] (1994). Communication to a third party is an essential element of most defamation
claims. KEETON ET AL., supra note 30 § 113, at 197. Under the theory of compelled self-
publication, however, an employee who is fired for defamatory reasons may sue her former
employer if the employee is compelled to tell a prospective employer why she lost her job.
The former employer may be liable even though it communicated the statement directly to the
plaintiff and to no one else. See, e.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d
876, 889-90 (Minn. 1986); McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94-95 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1980). For detailed discussion of compelled self-publication defamation, see gener-
ally Cooper, supra note 2; Louis B. Eble, Self-Publication Defamation: Employee Right or
Employee Burden?, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 745 (1995); Howard J. Siegel, Self-Publication: Defa-
mation Within the Employment Context, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1994); Deanna J. Mouser, Self-
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whether an employee could satisfy the publication element of defamation
when the employee, rather than her employer, disclosed to a prospective
employer defamatory reasons for termination. 243 In rejecting the com-
pelled self-publication theory, the court discussed the Tennessee refer-
ence immunity statute as evidence of policy concerns weighing in favor
of rejecting the doctrine of compelled self-publication. 244 The court ex-
pressed concern that recognition of the doctrine would require employers
to conduct investigations to ensure accurate conclusions about termina-
tion, and a requirement of investigation would compromise employment
at will in Tennessee. 245 To support this point, the court noted that the
immunity statute requires more than "mere negligence" to rebut the pre-
sumption of the employer's good faith.246 The court reasoned that if an
employer could not be liable for negligently communicating false defam-
atory information regarding an employee, the employer could not be lia-
ble when a former employee self-published the same information. 247
Consequently, the state supreme court reinstated the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in the case.
Nothing in the Sullivan opinion, however, indicates that the hospital
raised the statute as a defense to Sullivan's defamation claim. Nor was
the statute central to the result in the case. Because Sullivan addressed a
narrow issue, broader questions of the interpretation of the statute and its
reach and effectiveness await later cases. In addition, the case did not
present an opportunity to address the statute's relationship to the com-
mon law in a case based on a reference by the employer rather than
employee self-publication.
Maryland
Defendants in three cases in Maryland asserted the reference immu-
nity statute defense. A federal district court sitting in diversity jurisdic-
tion and applying Maryland law decided the first case, Deutsch v.
Chesapeake Center.248 In that case, Rev. William Deutsch and his wife
Elaine sued the Synod of the Mid-Atlantic of the Presbyterian Church
and the Synod's Executive Director, Rev. Dr. Carroll Jenkins, after being
terminated for "racist behavior and sexual harassment. ' 249 Rev. and
Publication Defamation and the Employment Relationship, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 241 (1991/
1992).
243 Id. at 572.
244 Id. at 574-75.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 ld. at 575.
248 Deutsch v. Chesapeake Ctr., 27 F. Supp. 2d 642 (D. Md. 1998).
249 Id. at 643. Apparently, Rev. Deutsch committed the alleged misconduct. Mrs.
Deutsch was terminated because she "was 'second in command and had to share responsibil-
ity.' Id.
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Mrs. Deutsch had been employed as Director and Food Service Director,
respectively, of the church's Chesapeake Center.
After Chesapeake Center terminated him, Rev. Deutsch applied for
a position as church pastor. Rev. Deutsch's employment papers included
a form authorizing any previous employer to release to prospective em-
ployers relevant information related to sexual misconduct. When con-
tacted by the prospective employer, Dr. Jenkins stated, "off the record,"
that the Chesapeake Center terminated Rev. Deutsch "because of diffi-
culties in the areas of sexual harassment and racial discrimination. '250
The Synod also provided Rev. and Mrs. Deutsch written explanations for
their discharge and the opportunity to respond to the Synod's Executive
Committee. However, the Deutsches did not make any presentation to
the Synod, and instead brought suit for breach of contract and
defamation.
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
applying both the common law conditional privilege and the statutory
privilege of Maryland's reference immunity statute. Holding that the
plaintiffs' defamation claims were "clearly barred" by the common law
privilege, the court also held that the plaintiffs failed to make the neces-
sary showing, by clear and convincing evidence, to rebut the statute's
presumption of good faith on the part of the employer. 251 The court also
emphasized the strong public policy behind the reference immunity stat-
ute, noting:
the statute in question (§ 5-423) sets forth a vital public
policy of Maryland. In a world in which employers face
almost insurmountable, and dreadfully costly, hurdles
trying to discharge an employee, due to the arsenal of
administrative and judicial artillery - including suits
such as this - that former employees can bring against
them, it is vital that they be allowed the latitude afforded
them by Maryland's statutory presumption of good faith
in giving and gathering references about prospective em-
ployees before hiring them.2 52
The Maryland statute also figured prominently in a decision of a
Kansas federal district court applying Maryland law in Boe v. Allied-
Signal Inc. 253 When Douglas Boe, a former employee of AlliedSignal,
applied for a position with the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"), the SEC notified him that he had been recommended for ap-
250 Id. at 644.
251 Id. at 645.
252 Id. at 645-46 (citations omitted).
253 Boe v. AlliedSignal Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Kan. 2001).
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pointment, pending reference and background checks. However, after
talking with Richard Wallman, AlliedSignal's Chief Financial Officer,
the SEC rescinded the recommendation. Speaking of Boe's performance
at AlliedSignal, Wallman told an SEC employee that Boe "sometimes
did good work, but it was inconsistent. '254 Wallman also added, "Then I
should say no comment," and "What does that tell you? ' 255 Based on
Wallman's statements, Boe sued AlliedSignal, alleging tortious interfer-
ence with a business relationship and defamation. 256
As Chief Financial Officer, Wallman did not have direct knowledge
of Boe's performance; any knowledge of Boe's work would have been
based on performance evaluations and reports from Boe's superiors. 257
Wallman's comments also violated company policy, which provided
only for "name, rank and serial number" references. 258 Boe also empha-
sized that he had reported to company officials numerous instances of
alleged improper accounting practices before AlliedSignal fired him.259
According to Boe, senior executives directed these entries in order to
satisfy earnings goals and ensure that they would collect bonuses. 260
Boe asserted that Wallman, a senior executive who received a bonus
based on earnings, had an incentive to prevent Boe from obtaining a job
with the SEC, where Boe could initiate an investigation of AlliedSignal's
accounting practices. 26'
The court applied Maryland law to the reference-based claims be-
cause Boe was living in Maryland when he applied for employment with
the SEC.262 Relying on the Maryland job reference immunity statute, the
court granted summary judgment dismissing Boe's claims for defamation
and tortious interference with a business relationship.263 Seeking gui-
dance from Deutsch v. Chesapeake Center,264 the court emphasized "the
importance that Maryland courts have placed on the presumption of good
faith found in § 5-423 of the Annotated Code of Maryland. ' 265 Noting
that the statute immunizes employers from liability for references in the
254 Id. at 1201.
255 Id.
256 Boe's lawsuit also challenged his termination and included claims of disability dis-
crimination and retaliatory discharge under state and federal law, breach of public policy, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 1199. The court applied Kansas law to the
state law claims related to the discharge and Maryland law to the claims for defamation and
tortious interference with business relations. Id. at 1206.
257 Id. at 1201-02.
258 Id. at 1202.
259 Id. at 1200.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 1202, 1207.
262 Id. at 1206.
263 Id. at 1208.
264 See discussion supra pp. 53-54.
265 Id. at 1207.
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absence of clear and convincing evidence of actual malice, or intentional
or reckless disclosure of false information, the court concluded that Boe
failed to present clear and convincing evidence of such conduct by Al-
liedSignal. 266 The court found that Boe presented no evidence to show
that Wallman's comment that Boe "sometimes did good work but it was
inconsistent" was made recklessly.267 The court also found implausible
Boe's theory that the statements "[t]hen I should say no comment" and
"[w]hat does that tell you?" were maliciously motivated by Wallman's
fear that Boe would get a job for the SEC and initiate an investigation
against AlliedSignal. 268 Finally, the court rejected Boe's argument that
adequate performance evaluations and violation of the policy restricting
reference information provided clear and convincing evidence of malice
or recklessness. 269 Accordingly, AlliedSignal was protected by the im-
munity statute's presumption of good faith, and Boe lost the case on
summary judgment.270
In a Maryland state court case, Darvish v. Gohari,271 the defendant
asserted the reference immunity statute as a defense in a defamation case.
Shahriar Gohari sued John Darvish in connection with Gohari's efforts to
obtain approval from the Central Atlantic Toyota Distributors, Inc.
("CATD") for the purchase of a Toyota dealership. Gohari worked for
Darvish's Darcars automotive group from 1987 until he quit in 1996. In
a meeting with representatives of CATD, Darvish allegedly made the
following statements: "(1) [Mr. Gohari] 'did not have the experience or
background to be considered qualified to operate a dealership;' (2) 'Mr.
Gohari had suddenly left the DARCARS organization several months
ago in an unprofessional manner and with no notice'; and (3) 'there was
a questionable financial manipulation by Mr. Gohari to inflate his com-
266 The court looked to Maryland case law for the definitions of "actual malice" and
"recklessness."
"Actual malice" can be established by showing that: a defamatory statement was a
calculated falsehood or lie "knowingly and deliberately published[;]" ... a defama-
tory statement was so inherently improbable that only a reckless person would have
put it in circulation; or the publisher had obvious reasons to distrust the accuracy of
the alleged defamatory statement or the reliability of the source of the statement.
(citation omitted).
... "'Reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would
have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be suffi-
cient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication.'" (citations omitted).
Id. at 1207.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id. at 1207-08.
270 Id. at 1208.
271 Darvish v. Gohari, 745 A.2d 1134 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
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pensation.' "272 Darvish also sent a confirming letter to CATD contain-
ing similar statements regarding Gohari.27 3
Darvish's defenses included the common law as well as the statu-
tory privilege. Gohari argued that neither the common law conditional
privilege nor the reference immunity applied because CATD was not a
prospective employer. Darvish contended that both privileges applied
because the communications arose out of an employer-employee
relationship. 274
Regarding the Maryland reference immunity statute, the court
agreed with Gohari. Because CATD was a prospective franchisor rather
than a prospective employer, the statements by Darvish "[did] not fall
within the letter of this statutory protection. ' 275 The court noted, how-
ever, that the reference immunity statute "did not abrogate the common
law."'276 Consequently, the court held that the common law privilege
protected Darvish's statements and remanded the case for consideration
of whether Gohari could prove that Darvish had abused the qualified
privilege. 2 77
Iowa
Finally, a recent job reference case in Iowa, Lowe v. Todd's Flying
Service, Inc.278 briefly discussed that state's reference immunity statute.
Lowe was a pilot who had worked for Todd's Hying Service. When
Lowe later applied for a job with DHL Airways, Allan Todd of Todd's
Flying Service allegedly made a number of disparaging comments when
asked for a reference regarding Lowe.27 9 Based on the allegedly deroga-
tory statements, Lowe sued Todd for defamation and interference with
prospective business advantage. Unfortunately for Lowe, DHL's appli-
cation process included a release form that relieved any former employ-
ers of liability for providing references, and Lowe had signed the release.
Therefore, Lowe argued that Todd's statements were intentional and ma-
licious and that it was against public policy for a release to immunize
272 Id. at 1136.
273 Id. at 1137.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 1139.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 1140.
278 Lowe v. Todd's Flying Serv., Inc., No. 0-694/99-0708, 2001 Iowa App. LEXIS 53
(Jan. 24, 2001) (unpublished opinion).
279 Todd, the former employer, allegedly made the following comments to DHL Airways
when giving a reference regarding Lowe: "1) Lowe quit without notice, 2) Lowe left him high
and dry, 3) Lowe's work quality was poor, 4) Lowe's attendance was poor, 5) Lowe's attitude
was poor, 6) Lowe's employment period was approximately two to three months in duration,
and 7) Lowe refused a drug test." Id. at *3.
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such conduct.280 Specifically, Lowe contended that Iowa's reference im-
munity statute did not provide immunity for information provided with
malice.281 However, Lowe failed to raise the issue before the trial court.
Consequently, the appellate court did not address the statutory argument,
and there was no opportunity for the court to interpret the Iowa reference
immunity statute.
C. PATTERNS IN THE CASE LAW
The following analysis must begin with a caveat: generalizations
from the existing case law necessarily are preliminary. With only nine
reported cases as of this writing, any analysis of the "body" of reference
immunity statute case law has obvious limitations. Only one of the nine
cases is a decision of a state supreme court, and that case addresses self-
publication defamation by the employee rather than a communication by
an employer.2812 Notwithstanding these limitations, the early cases shed
light-even if not particularly bright light-on how courts may interpret
the statutes in future cases.
Judicial analysis of the relationship between the statutes and the
common law should be a key issue as the cases unfold. In cases to date,
courts analyze the statutes as codifications of common law privileges.283
The statutes can supplement the common law, providing employers an
additional or alternative means of asserting that references are protected
by privilege.284 Thus, courts have applied both the common law and
statutory privileges to immunize defendants from liability. An employer
who does not meet the requirements of the statute may be able to rely on
280 Id. at *9.
281 Iowa Code § 91B.2 provides immunity unless the employer "acted unreasonably in
providing the work-related information." IOWA CODE ANN. § 91B.1 (West Supp. 2001).
Lowe relied on the following definition of unreasonable conduct under the statute: "The work-
related information is not relevant to the inquiry being made, is provided with malice, or is
provided with no good faith belief that it is true." IOWA CODE ANN. § 91B.2.c (West Supp.
2001).
282 Sullivan v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp., 995 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. 1999). See discussion supra,
at pp. 52-53.
283 See Linafelt v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc., 745 So.2d 386, 388; (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (describing statute as "the Legislature's codification of the common law"); Thomas
v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 761 So.2d 401, 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 2000) ("legislative codification
of the common law of qualified privilege"); Davis v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 987 P.2d 1172,
1182 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (observing that "[t]he statute would appear to track much of the
common-law privilege relating to defamation and good-faith comments in the employment
context").
284 See Deutsch v. Chesapeake Ctr, 27 F. Supp. 2d 642, 645 (D. Md.1998); Davis, 987
P.2d at 1181 (observingthat "[i]n addition to the common law, New Mexico has recently
added a statutory privilege"); Bemofsky v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, No. 98-1792, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5561 (E.D. La. Apr. 18, 2000), affd 253 F.3d 700 (5th Cir. 2001) (granting
summary judgment apparently on the grounds of both common law and statutory privilege).
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the common law as a fallback position.285 None of the current cases
interprets an immunity statute as providing the sole ground for affirma-
tive defense in a reference case.
Where statutes require plaintiffs to defeat the privilege with clear
and convincing evidence, the evidentiary standard figures prominently in
courts' analyses. Courts emphasize that the statutory privilege imposes a
higher evidentiary burden on plaintiffs than the burden borne by plain-
tiffs under the common law.286 Should courts determine that employers
may invoke both the statutory and common law privileges, a statute's
clear and convincing evidence standard may encourage employers to
choose the statute as their first line of defense.
Where courts apply the reference immunity statute and the common
law privilege, conflicting evidentiary standards may confuse juries. An
employer's claims of privilege most likely will be based on one set of
facts. Jurors will be required to apply differing standards of proof in
evaluating the facts. When assessing facts relating to the statutory privi-
lege, jurors will apply the clear and convincing evidence test. Con-
versely, when assessing facts relating to the common law privilege,
jurors will apply the preponderance of the evidence standard. Judges
will need to ensure that jurors understand the differing burdens of proof
and apply the correct standard depending on whether the claimed privi-
lege is based on the statute or the common law. 287 In this regard, the
statutes add confusion and complexity to job reference litigation.
The statutory privilege also requires that the circumstances of the
particular case fall within the letter of the statute with regard to the na-
ture of the communication or the person to whom the communication is
made. In Florida, the statute covers statements about "job performance,"
while other workplace statements are not protected by the statutory privi-
lege.288 Under Maryland law, a statement regarding job performance
was not protected by the statute when the former employer communi-
cated with a franchising organization rather than a "prospective em-
ployer.' '289 Employers who lose the statutory privilege because of
noncompliance with the terms, however, may claim the protection of the
common law qualified privilege. 290
285 See Darvish v. Gohari, 745 A.2d 1134, 1139 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000)(finding that
communication to franchisor was not protected by the statute because franchisor was not a
"prospective employer," and applied common law qualified privilege to communication).
286 See Linafelt, 745 So. 2d at 389-90; Deutsch, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 645-46.
287 See Linafelt, 745 So. 2d at 389-90 (finding that jury rendered verdict without consider-
ing whether plaintiff had met the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence).
288 See Thomas, 761 So. 2d 404-05 (finding a computerized report sent to members of
racetrack security bureau matter of common law privilege and statement to prospective em-
ployer was within category of "comments about job performance" under the statute).
289 Darvish, 745 A.2d at 1134.
290 See id. at 1139-40.
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Based on the early cases, it appears that reference immunity statutes
may aid employers in obtaining summary disposition of defamation and
other communication-based claims in the workplace. Summary disposi-
tion is more likely under a clear and convincing standard of proof than
under a preponderance of the evidence test. However, in cases involving
factual disputes regarding whether statements were made or the content
of statements made, those issues will remain for trial. Plaintiffs also may
succeed in raising factual issues regarding whether their employers' con-
duct constituted good faith.
Like their existing common law privilege counterparts, the refer-
ence immunity statutes provide conditional protection when the em-
ployer is sued. However, given that the common law privilege did not
dissuade employers from using the "name, rank and serial number" ap-
proach, there is little reason to believe codification of the privilege magi-
cally will transform perceptions of employers-or their advisers-and
make them comfortable in giving references. In addition, because many
employers prefer to avoid lawsuits altogether rather than relying on im-
munity to protect them once they are sued, the qualified immunity does
not adequately address their concerns. While this problem is not unique
to reference immunity statutes, the lingering threat of being sued -even
with the protection of statutory qualified immunity-may keep many
employers tied to "name, rank and serial number" policies. In that event,
the statutes inevitably will fail as a catalyst for changing reference
practices.
V. THINKING OUTSIDE THE LEGISLATIVE BOX: BEYOND
STATUTES AS THE PRIMARY MEANS OF REFORMING JOB
REFERENCE LAW, POLICIES AND PRACTICES
A. CHANGING EMPLOYERS' PERCEPTIONS AND VALUES
The reference situation presents a textbook "prisoner's dilemma"
scenario, resulting in a stalemate between employers who need informa-
tion and those who withhold information to protect themselves from law-
suits. 29 1 Like persons caught in the classic prisoner's dilemma,
employers in the reference context must choose between acting in their
individual best interests or acting for the benefit of themselves and other
employers.
291 See Adler & Peirce, supra note 2, at 1426. To explain the prisoner's dilemma con-
cept, Adler and Peirce quote a definition from a negotiation text: "prisoners [sic] dilemma is
simply an abstract formulation of some very common ... situations in which what is best for
each person individually leads to mutual [lack of cooperation,] whereas everyone would have
been better off with mutual cooperation." Id. at n.231 (citing Robert Axelrod, The Problem of
Cooperation, in NEGOTIATION: READINGS, EXERCISES, AND CASES 71-79 (Roy Lewicki et al.,
eds. 1983)).
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The individual best interest is served by obtaining references yet
refusing to provide them. By obtaining references, employers gain infor-
mation in the hiring process that may assist them in avoiding claims for
negligent hiring. Alternatively, if reference information warrants addi-
tional caution, employers who receive references may undertake addi-
tional supervision and monitoring of new employees, thereby reducing
the risk of harm or potential claims for negligent supervision. Employers
who follow "name, rank and serial number" policies minimize the risk of
lawsuits based on negative or misleading references. While this situation
may appear to serve individual employers' interests, the lack of mutual
exchange of information impedes the flow of valuable information in the
hiring process.
Conversely, mutual cooperation serves the interest of both parties.
Mutual cooperation occurs when each employer who seeks references
receives references in return. This mutual exchange of information bene-
fits both parties, although each employer bears some risk of suit. The
reference provider risks a lawsuit if she provides a negative or mislead-
ing reference. The employer who obtains a reference may be sued for
negligent hiring if she fails to adequately investigate the information she
receives. In the mutual cooperation scenario, there is mutual benefit and
risk for both parties (although employers perhaps may bear a larger liti-
gation risk in giving references rather than in receiving them).
The least favorable outcome results where only one party provides
references while the other does not. In that situation, the employer who
receives the information is a "free-rider" who benefits from receiving
references but who does not take on any of the risks inherent in provid-
ing them.292 The free-rider can make informed hiring decisions -
thereby increasing the efficiency of the hiring process and receiving in-
formation sufficient to avoid negligent hiring claims - while maintaining
a "name, rank and serial number" policy to avoid lawsuits. 293
Legislation alone is an ineffective means of breaking this stalemate.
The conventional wisdom of the workplace promotes the following ideas
292 Adler & Peirce, supra note 2, at 1426.
293 For further discussion of the prisoner's dilemma and free rider concepts in the context
of job references, see the work of Professors Adler & Peirce, supra note 2, at 1425-27. For
another discussion of the free-rider problem in job references, see STEVEN L. WILLBORN Er
AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 361 (2d ed. 1998). Describing the free rider
problem, the authors write:
The risks that a candidly negative reference will be found defamatory fall on the old
employer, while the benefits accrue to the interviewing employer. As a result, a
policy of refusing to give references may be wise for each individual employer, even
though it would harm the public interest by limiting the flow of valuable information
about prospective employees.
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that encourage "name, rank and serial number" and neutral reference
policies:
" employers place themselves at risk by giving
references;
• wise and cautious employers will avoid this risk at all
cost; and
" risks of providing references outweigh any benefits
of receiving them.
As long as these beliefs shape employers' job reference strategies,
we should not expect to see a large scale change in reference policies,
even if all fifty states and the District of Columbia enact reference immu-
nity legislation. To be most effective, shifts in workplace culture, atti-
tudes and norms must supplement legislation.
Change in three areas could serve as a catalyst for adoption of open
reference policies and practices. First, because fear of litigation is the
primary impetus for adopting "name, rank and serial number" and neu-
tral reference policies, changing employers' perception of the risk of ref-
erence-based litigation must be a fundamental objective of reform
efforts. Notwithstanding the prevailing perceptions based on a limited
number of sensational cases, the actual number of reference cases is
small, and plaintiffs frequently lose those cases. 294 Employers need this
information to shape reference policies based on actual risk levels rather
than perceived and inflated notions of risk. To this end, human resource,
legal and general interest media should inform employers of studies re-
garding the actual number of reference lawsuits and the relatively low
success rates of plaintiffs in those cases. 295 Media reports could include
more balanced coverage, so that reports of the occasional high profile,
large verdict case can share the stage with reports of verdicts reduced or
overturned on appeal. If employers understand that the litigation risk is
small, reference policies no longer will be shaped primarily by the fear of
being sued. 296
Closely related to changing perceptions of risk is the second shift in
workplace thinking: accepting the small risk of reference litigation as a
cost of doing business.297 Knowing that the chance of being sued is a
294 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
295 See discussion infra Part V.B.
296 Arguably, reference immunity statutes also might play a role in correcting employers'
perceptions of the risk of being sued. See WILLBORN Er AL., supra note 293, at 362 (arguing
that if employers' refusal to give references is based on an unrealistic fear of being sued,
reference immunity "statutes may increase reference-giving by correcting employer mis-
perceptions about their exposure to defamation liability, even if [the statutes] do not change
the actual liability standard at all.").
297 See Sixel, supra note 90, at I ("Probably the best thing is for employers to step up to
the plate and accept the risk of giving out references as the cost of doing business .... It's to
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small one, employers will be more willing to accept the minimal risk
involved in providing references so that free flowing, useful communica-
tion can replace silence as the model reference strategy in the workplace.
The third proposed shift focuses on the unity of self-interest and
mutual benefit in the reference-based "prisoner's dilemma." As empha-
sis moves from the risks of reference-giving to the benefits of open com-
munication regarding prospective employees, the workplace can return to
the model of providing references "upon request" as a matter of profes-
sional courtesy, mutual obligation and mutual benefit among employers.
This shift requires a workplace culture that recognizes and values the
way in which reference information assists employers in making good
hiring decisions that in turn increase efficiency and safety in the work-
place. When these benefits are balanced against the modest litigation
risk of providing references, employers will recognize that both self-in-
terest and mutual interest are served by giving useful references rather
than neutral or "name, rank and serial number" responses. Moreover,
because the litigation risk is small, self-interest is not best served by re-
fraining from providing references. Instead, employers who adhere to
"name, rank and serial number" do themselves a disservice. While these
employers may avoid the limited risk of being sued, they face an intangi-
ble, but more substantial loss in the process of making hiring decisions.
Information needed to assess prospective employees will not be available
to them. As one writer has observed, "After all, what goes around,
comes around. When [a] company seeks a recommendation about some-
one it would like to hire, the reference from her last employer may be as
unhelpful as the references [the] company gives other employers. 298
Individual businesses and employers collectively will be better
served if "what goes around" in references is candid, useful, and mean-
ingful information regarding workers' job performance. With changes in
the reference paradigm, mutual cooperation in references would be rec-
ognized as serving the individual and collective interests of employers.
In addition, employees who were previously unable to obtain references
under the "name, rank and serial number" model will benefit from open-
ing the channels of communication.
B. LEGISLATION AND EDUCATION: COMBINING STATUTES AND PUBLIC
INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS
Notwithstanding flaws in the statutory scheme, legislation remains
the centerpiece of efforts to reform job reference law, policies and prac-
the advantage of the community to get the information out and there probably wouldn't be a
big rush to the courthouse if the employers gave out references.") (quoting T.J. Wray, an
employment lawyer with Fulbright & Jaworski in Houston).
298 Fray-Witzer, supra note 11, at 31.
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tices. Using statutes as the sole mechanism for reform, however, is un-
likely to result in meaningful changes in employers' approaches to
references. Even a flawless statute, enacted in every state, would be un-
likely to end the reference stalemate without public awareness of the law.
Accordingly, the statutes should be part of a multi-pronged effort to edu-
cate and inform employers about the low risk of being sued, the exis-
tence of the immunity statutes, and the legal rules that apply to providing
references.
An effective education campaign will require the efforts of legisla-
tors, the employment law bar, human resource organizations, and other
organizations that provide resources regarding personnel and employ-
ment law issues! On the legislative front, sponsoring legislators should
publicize the enactment or amendment of immunity statutes in their
states. The employment law bar, human resource organizations and
other resource groups should disseminate information to members, cli-
ents and the public via conferences, seminars, newsletters, the trade press
and the general interest media. Media involvement is critical to refer-
ence reform efforts. Over the years, both the trade press and popular
press have highlighted job reference horror stories. With numerous re-
ports chronicling a rising number of workplace defamation cases, large
verdicts, and the escalating risk of litigation, 299 the press played a key
role in transforming "name, rank and serial number" reference policies
from "urban legend" to workplace reality. 3°° To reach businesses with
limited legal resources, a broad-based, diversified, and multilevel infor-
mation process is essential. With information available through a variety
of reliable and publicly available resources, there is an increased oppor-
tunity to reach small businesses that may not have ongoing legal repre-
sentation or information regarding job reference laws.
The combination of statutory protection and education will
strengthen the effectiveness of the statutes by arming employers with
information needed to make them comfortable in sharing reference infor-
mation.30 1 Also, to the extent that many statutes have requirements that
299 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 5.
300 See Long, supra note 12, at 226-27. Regarding the perception that employers risk
defamation suits if they give references, Long observes:
Whatever the reality, employers apparently believe that defamation lawsuits are a
deterrent to providing references. Like the story about Jimmy Hoffa being buried
under the end zone at Giants Stadium, the belief is not unlike urban folklore. The
stories have been repeated so often that they are now accepted as being true. Until
this belief is addressed adequately, the problem is likely to continue.
Id. (emphasis in original).
301 See Long, supra note 12, at 228. Long calls for "a combination of legislative action
and grass roots effort[s]" using legislatures and "employer groups" in coordinated efforts to
inform employers of the actual risks of providing references and how to reduce any such risk.
Id. While Long focuses primarily on "employer groups" as the persons with the primary
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may trap the unwary employer, information is important to maximize the
protection afforded by the statute.30 2 Finally, education and information
should be used in a positive, proactive manner. With education, employ-
ers can provide references that not only will avoid any legal challenges
but also will be useful and constructive, to the mutual benefit of all in the
workplace. 303
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the mid-1990s, the majority of states enacted reference immu-
nity legislation. The objective of the legislation is two-fold: to assuage
employers' fears of being sued over job references, and, in turn, to en-
courage employers to abandon "no comment" and "name, rank and serial
number" reference policies. Although most states adopted reference im-
munity statutes, the conventional wisdom and advice in the workplace
remains unchanged. Thus far, immunity statutes appear to have little, if
any, impact on employers' practices or the advice given by the lawyers
and human resource professionals who counsel employers. Nor is it
likely that the statutes will encourage a significant change in reference
practices in the future, in light of the language of the statutes and the
statutes' duplication of existing legal standards - standards that have
been resoundingly ineffective in deterring the use of "name, rank and
serial number" policies.304
The current generation of reference immunity statutes also creates
new problems. Rather than simplifying and clarifying the law of job
responsibility for the education campaign, his proposals also acknowledge that legislators
should play a role in the informational process. Id. at 226-28; see also Schainblatt, supra note
15, at 744-45 (observing that "[a]s employers learn more about the protection afforded by the
new law, their anxieties about providing reference information may lessen."); Cooper, supra
note 2, at 328.
302 For example, employers may forfeit the immunity under the technical requirements of
many statutes. In those states, it is not enough to give employers notice that the statutes exist.
Employers also must be aware of the steps to be taken to qualify for the immunity, and they
must know that failure to do so will leave them without the statute's protection.
303 See Long, supra note 12, at 227 (suggesting that statutes by themselves will not
change current reference practices, Long calls for "employer groups" to initiate an educational
campaign to correct the misconception of the risk of being sued and to "coordinate an educa-
tion program that will teach employers how to avoid [reference] suits").
304 As Professor Verkerke concluded:
These enactments vary somewhat in their specifics, but none seriously modifies the
existing structure of liability under the common law. Employers remain subject to
defamation suit for falsely negative references, and the legislation typically codifies
the existence of a conditional privilege for providing reference information. It re-
mains to be seen whether such provisions will significantly increase the burden on
plaintiffs attempting to prove abuse of the privilege. However, a plain reading of the
language most commonly used in these statutes suggests that dramatic change is
unlikely.
Verkerke, supra note 2, at 132.
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references, the statutes complicate and confuse matters. Because the
statutes generally are not the exclusive remedy for job reference claims,
duplication of claims and defenses is possible and likely. Employers re-
main open to common law as well as statutory liability. Employees also
must contend with common law defenses; they cannot look to the stat-
utes alone for clear rules regarding privileges in reference claims. In
addition, the most effective provisions for protecting employers - fee-
shifting and requiring plaintiffs to prove loss of immunity with clear and
convincing evidence-are draconian measures that deter even meritori-
ous claims. In short, today's reference immunity statutes are a politically
popular-yet problematic and ineffective-response to calls for more
openness in job references.
These concerns notwithstanding, the reality is that reference immu-
nity legislation has become a common feature of state regulation of the
employment relationship. Addressing the reference problem with legis-
lation alone, however, will not be sufficient to bring about significant
changes in reference practices. At the heart of the problem lie matters
not readily amenable to a solely legislative fix: changing human behavior
in the face of widely held misconceptions of risk and widespread dis-
counting of the mutual benefit in having open reference practices. Legal
reforms also should be combined with efforts to educate employers and
to influence the development of a new workplace culture in which em-
ployers exchange honest and meaningful references, knowing that the
risk of lawsuit is small and the benefits of free flowing communication
reach employers, employees and the public. Without a coordinated effort
to disseminate information and change employers' perceptions, immu-
nity legislation will be just a footnote in a futile battle against "name,
rank and serial number" practices.
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APPENDIX
STATE REFERENCE IMMUNITY STATUTES
AS OF JANUARY 2002305
Year Standard of Proof
State Code Section Enacted (if stated in statute) 306
Alaska Alaska Stat. § 09.65.160 1993 Preponderance
(Michie 2000)
Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1361 1996
(West Supp. 2001)
Arkansas Ark. Code Ann. § 11-3-204 1999 Preponderance
(Michie 2000)
California Cal. Civ. Code § 47c (West 1994307
Supp. 2001)
Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-2-114 1992, Preponderance
(West Supp. 2001) 1999308
Delaware Del. Code. Ann. tit. 19, § 709 1996309
(Supp. 2000)
Florida Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.095 (West 1991310 Clear and convincing
Supp. 2002)
Georgia Ga. Code Ann. § 34-1-4 1993 Preponderance
(Michie 2001)
Hawaii Haw. Rev. Stat. § 663-1.95 1998 Preponderance
(Supp. 2000)
Idaho Idaho Code § 44-201 (Michie 1996 Clear and convincing
1997)
Illinois 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 46/10 1996 Preponderance
et seq. (West Supp. 2001)
Indiana Ind. Code. Ann. § 22-5-3-1 1995 Preponderance
(Michie 1997)
Iowa Iowa Code Ann. § 91B.2 (West 1997
Supp. 2001)
305 This table updates information originally compiled in Cooper, supra note 2, at 335-36.
306 Where statutes do not expressly state the burden of proof, the preponderance of the
evidence standard applies. See discussion supra note 88.
307 The California legislature amended Civil Code § 47c in 1994 to expressly cover
employment references. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 47c (West Supp. 2001), Historical and
Statutory Notes; Margaret Hart Edwards, Job References: Legislature Amends Civil Code to
Protect Communications About Applicants' Performance or Qualifications, CAL. Bus. L.
REPORTER, March 1995, at 271.
308 The Colorado legislature repealed and reenacted the reference immunity statute in
1999. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-114 (West Supp. 2001), Historical and Statutory
Notes.
309 Originally numbered § 708, the section was re-designated as § 709 in 1997. See DEL.
CODE. ANN. tit. 19, § 709 (Supp. 2000), Revisor's note.
310 Amended in 1999. The 1999 amendments made substantial changes in the language
of the Florida statute. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West Supp. 2002), Historical and
Statutory Notes.
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Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-119a 1995
(2000)
Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:291 1995 Preponderance
(West 1998)
Maine Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, 1995 Clear and convincing
§ 598 (West Supp. 2001)
Maryland Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. 1996 Clear and convincing
Proc. § 5-423 (1998)
Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 1996 Preponderance
§ 423.452 (West 2001)
Missouri Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.152 1999
(2000)
Montana Mont. Code. Ann. § 27-1-737 1999
(2000)
Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41.755 1997
(Michie 1999)
New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50-12-1 1995
(Michie Supp. 2000)
North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.12 1997 Preponderance
(1999)
North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code § 34-02-18 1997 Preponderance
(1999 Supp.)
Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1996 Preponderance
§ 4113.71 (Anderson 2001)
Oklahoma Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, § 61 1995 Preponderance
(West 1999)
Oregon Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.178 (1999) 1995 Preponderance
Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-6.4-1 1996 Preponderance
1(2000)
South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. § 41-1-65 (Law 1996
Co-op Supp. 2000)
South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws § 60-4-12 1996 Clear and convincing
(Michie Supp. 2001)
Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-105 1995 Preponderance
(Supp. 2001)
Texas Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 103.001 1999 Clear and convincing
et seq. (Vernon Supp. 2002)
Utah Utah Code. Ann. § 34-42-1 1995 Clear and convincing
(1997)
Virginia Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-46.1 2000 Clear and convincing
(Michie 2000)
Wisconsin Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.487 1996 Clear and convincing
(West Supp. 2001)
Wyoming Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-1-113 1996311 Preponderance
(Michie 2001)
311 Amended in 1999. The amendments substituted the word "employee" and its plural
possessive forms for the word "employe" and its plural and possessive forms. See Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 895.487 (West Supp. 2001), Historical and Statutory Notes.
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